Ryde v London Borough of Enfield

On a renewed second-appeal application in homelessness proceedings, permission should be refused where the proposed grounds disclose no important point of principle or practice and no compelling reason for appellate intervention.

Regulation 8(2) of the 1999 Regulations is an important fairness safeguard. A failure to comply does not automatically require relief if the reviewing court finds that it caused no prejudice. Whether later medical evidence should be referred to a medical assessment officer is fact-sensitive. Medical evidence must be considered carefully, but the statutory vulnerability judgment remains one for the housing authority, subject ordinarily to Wednesbury review.

The applicant challenged Enfield’s review decision that he was not homeless and in priority need. The decision followed medical evidence concerning epilepsy, depression, alcoholism, homelessness and vulnerability, including evidence from Dr Lucas. The authority did not refer the later medical material to its medical officer.

The Edmonton County Court upheld the authority’s decision. It identified possible deficiencies in the original decision, including insufficient weight given to age and an imperfect application of the Pereira test, but held that the review decision was not unlawful or Wednesbury unreasonable. It also found no prejudicial failure under regulation 8(2). The central issue was whether a second appeal raised an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason.

1. Permission refused. The application was a second appeal. The applicant therefore had to show an important point of principle or practice, or some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. The proposed issues did not meet that threshold.
2. Regulation 8(2) of the 1999 Regulations forms part of the procedures intended to secure fairness. A reviewing court may nevertheless refuse relief where non-compliance caused no prejudice. The judge had not treated the regulation as optional. Her conclusion that the applicant had opportunities to provide relevant information, and that later representations produced the same result, was fact-sensitive and disclosed no error of law.
3. The court declined to formulate a general rule requiring new medical evidence always to be referred to a medical assessment officer. Medical evidence has an important role and expert guidance may be appropriate, but the question depends on the individual case. The statutory issue of vulnerability is for the authority, not medical experts, and its approach is ordinarily challengeable only if Wednesbury unreasonable. The earlier decision concerning Mrs Carter turned on inadequate reasons and did not establish an absolute referral duty.
4. The court endorsed the practical approach stated in Cramp v Hastings Borough Council: the duty to decide what inquiries are necessary rests with the senior housing officer, whose decision is lawful unless no reasonable council could have reached it on the available material.
5. The court observed that scarce legal aid resources should not ordinarily be used for a case that has become purely academic. Authorities should notify the Legal Services Commission promptly when accommodation has been secured, although that consideration was unnecessary to the refusal of permission.

The application was refused with costs. The applicant’s contribution under section 11 of the Access to Justice Act was assessed at nil, with costs subject to public funding assessment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): permission to appeal refused. The application was treated as a renewed second-appeal application arising from the Edmonton County Court’s decision dated 28 January 2005.
• Edmonton County Court: the challenge to Enfield’s homelessness review decision was dismissed. The court found that any procedural deficiency had caused no prejudice and that the authority’s decision was not Wednesbury unreasonable.