Osmani v London Borough of Camden

For vulnerability under section 189(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1996, the question is a composite comparative assessment. The authority must ask whether, on the assumption of homelessness, the applicant would be less able than an ordinary homeless person to fend for himself and would therefore suffer greater injury or detriment.

The assessment is not confined to an ability to find accommodation. It includes the applicant’s general ability to cope while homeless. A housing authority must consider the risk that mental illness, including depression, may worsen on homelessness, but it decides the statutory question and is not bound by medical opinion. On a section 204 appeal, the court reviews legality and rationality; it does not substitute its own evaluative judgment.

The appellant, a Kosovan man with post-traumatic stress disorder and depression, sought homelessness assistance from the London Borough of Camden. The authority decided that he was not in priority need because he was not vulnerable within section 189(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1996.

After an earlier successful County Court appeal and a further review, the authority again found that he was able to manage daily activities and was not likely, if homeless, to suffer the relevant greater harm. His second County Court appeal was dismissed. He appealed to the Court of Appeal, contending that the authority had assessed his condition while temporarily housed rather than the risk if he became street homeless, and had given inadequate reasons.

1. Appeal dismissed. Auld LJ, with whom Judge and May LJJ agreed, held that the authority had lawfully applied section 189(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1996 and the test in R v Camden LBC, ex p Pereira (1999) 31 HLR 317.

2. The statutory question is not whether the applicant is presently homeless, nor whether he has unusual difficulty in finding accommodation. It is whether, if homeless, he would have a lesser ability than an ordinary homeless person to fend for himself, so that he would suffer greater injury or detriment. Difficulty in obtaining accommodation may be relevant, but is neither the sole nor an essential component of vulnerability. The inquiry is a single, composite assessment.

3. The authority must assess the applicant on the assumption that he has become, or will become, street homeless. It should consider the particular debilitating effects of depressive disorders and the loss of the stability provided by a home. Medical evidence is important, but vulnerability is a statutory and evaluative judgment for the housing authority.

4. On an appeal under section 204, the County Court applies public-law standards. Following Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets LBC [2003] 2 AC 430, the court may intervene for legal error, unfairness, irrationality, unsupported findings, or material factual misunderstanding, but should not replace the authority’s evaluative judgment. Reasons must permit an applicant to decide whether to challenge the decision, but the decision letter must be read fairly and as a whole.

5. The reviewing officer had obtained and considered the medical material, recognised the correct future-risk question, and considered treatment, professional monitoring, support from the appellant’s wife, and his demonstrated daily functioning. Her conclusion that the appellant would not be less able to fend for himself, or suffer the requisite greater harm, was reasonably open to her. The reasons were sufficient.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Dismissed the appellant’s second appeal: [2004] EWCA Civ 1706.
• Central London County Court: His Honour Judge Crawford Lindsay QC dismissed the appellant’s second appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996, holding that the authority’s decision was not unlawful or irrational.
• Central London County Court: Ms Recorder Eady had earlier allowed a section 204 appeal, quashed the authority’s earlier decision, and required a further section 202 review.