London Borough of Wandsworth v Allison

On an appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996, the county court must apply judicial-review principles. It must ask whether the local authority’s decision was Wednesbury unreasonable, not whether the court would have reached a different factual conclusion. The authority remains the primary fact-finder and is entitled to evaluate competing medical evidence. Vulnerability requires comparison with the ordinary homeless person and consideration of whether homelessness would cause injury or detriment which that comparator could avoid. A medical adviser may assist the authority in understanding and evaluating medical evidence, while the statutory decision remains the authority’s. The appeal was therefore allowed because the reviewing officer’s decision was properly open to her.

The respondent applied for housing under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 after suffering deep vein thrombosis and reporting symptoms of Raynaud’s phenomenon. The local authority decided, on review, that he was not vulnerable and therefore had no priority need under section 189(1)(c).

On an appeal under section 204, the Recorder held that the authority had fundamentally misunderstood important medical evidence. He allowed the appeal and declared that the respondent was in priority need. The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether that decision unlawfully substituted the court’s assessment of the evidence for the judgment entrusted to the local authority.

1. Appeal allowed. The Recorder’s order was set aside and the authority’s decision of 30 January 2007 was restored.
2. The county court’s jurisdiction under section 204 is analogous to judicial review, although section 204(3) gives it a statutory power to confirm, quash or vary the decision. The correct question was whether the reviewing officer’s decision was Wednesbury unreasonable: whether no housing officer properly directing herself to the material could have reached it. The Recorder instead decided the case on his own perception of the facts.
3. The local authority was the arbiter of fact and evaluative judgment. It had considered the relevant medical evidence, applied the Pereira test, and was entitled to accept and weigh Dr Keen’s advice. The Recorder was not entitled to substitute his own assessment merely because he regarded other medical evidence as more persuasive.
4. The reviewing officer’s initial statement of the Pereira test was correct. Her later reference to whether the respondent was incapable of fending for himself was an immaterial slip, particularly because the Recorder accepted that the correct test had been understood and applied.
5. Shala v Birmingham City Council [2007] EWCA Civ 624 was distinguishable. In this case Dr Keen had commented on the medical evidence to assist the authority in understanding and evaluating it. His advice was within his expertise, and the authority was entitled to give it weight without requiring him to examine the applicant.
6. On the evidence, it was open to the reviewing officer to regard compliance with warfarin treatment as non-onerous, to find no particular risk of recurrent thrombosis with compliance, and to treat the Raynaud’s diagnosis as unconfirmed and the absence of treatment as relevant. The Pereira comparison was therefore not shown to be satisfied.
7. Arden LJ agreed, emphasising that the only prescribed medication was warfarin, that all the medical evidence had been considered by Dr Keen, and that it was open to the reviewing officer to conclude that compliance would not be difficult for a homeless person.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the decision of Recorder Robin Spon-Smith in the Wandsworth County Court on 31 May 2007. The appeal was allowed, the Recorder’s order was set aside, and the local authority’s review decision was restored.
• Wandsworth County Court: Allowed the respondent’s section 204 appeal and declared that he was in priority need under section 189(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1996.