Johnson v Solihull

For priority need under section 189 of the Housing Act 1996, vulnerability is determined by the single, composite Pereira inquiry. The applicant must, when homeless, be less able than an ordinary homeless person to fend for himself, such that he will suffer injury or detriment which that person would avoid.

The comparator is a real-world ordinary homeless person. It need not be a person without drug issues or other common features of homelessness. The authority must assess all relevant circumstances together, including available support. A reviewing court will not disturb a rational factual assessment merely by isolating one strand of the evidence.

The appellant challenged Solihull’s reviewed decision of 8 May 2012 that he was not in priority need for accommodation under section 189(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1996. He had a history of drug dependency, offending, custodial sentences and periods of rough sleeping.

His section 204 appeal was dismissed by His Honour Judge Oliver Jones QC in Birmingham County Court. He brought a second appeal, contending that the review officer had used the wrong comparator for vulnerability, had failed to make a proper composite assessment, and had irrationally assessed the effect of his release from custody.

The central issue was whether the review decision disclosed an error of law in applying the statutory vulnerability test.

Appeal dismissed. Arden LJ gave the judgment, with which Jackson and McCombe LJJ agreed.

1. The governing test was that stated in Pereira: an applicant is vulnerable only if, when homeless, he is less able to fend for himself than an ordinary homeless person, so that he will suffer injury or detriment when that comparator would cope without harmful effects. It is a single and composite test, rather than separate elements.
2. The review officer had not used an impermissible comparator. An ordinary homeless person is assessed in the real world. Such a person need not be assumed to have no experience of drug issues. It was therefore open to the officer to use the homelessness survey as limited assistance in identifying characteristics of the comparator. The officer had also found that the appellant could maintain available treatment and support.
3. The officer was required to assess the appellant’s circumstances collectively. Her decision expressly did so. A composite assessment need not alter the conclusions reached about each individual circumstance, provided the decision shows that their combined effect was considered. There was no misdirection.
4. Paragraph 5(3)(a) of the Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) (England) Order 2002 is not confined by its language to long-term prisoners. That point was not, however, part of the review decision and was not determinative. The officer’s conclusion that the appellant had not become institutionalised, and could manage his affairs after release, was a holistic and rational assessment of the evidence. The appellant could not establish perversity by relying on one evidential strand.

The County Court had correctly found no error of law in the review decision. The appeal was dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — In [2013] EWCA Civ 752, dismissed the appellant’s second appeal.
• Birmingham County Court — His Honour Judge Oliver Jones QC dismissed the appellant’s appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996.
• Solihull review decision — On 8 May 2012, the review officer decided that the appellant was not in priority need under section 189(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1996.