Sam v Atkins

Negligence is a composite concept comprising duty, breach, causation and damage. The central inquiry is whether the scope of the defendant’s duty in the circumstances extends to avoiding the kind of injury actually sustained. That inquiry necessarily includes whether the defendant’s acts or omissions caused the injury.

A driver is not required to meet an unattainable standard of perfection. Where a pedestrian emerges so late that a collision is unavoidable at any reasonable speed, the driver is not in breach of a duty owed in respect of that accident. Conduct which might have endangered another person in different circumstances does not establish liability for the claimant’s injury.

The claimant suffered severe injuries when she stepped from in front of a stationary transit van into the path of the defendant’s Landrover. The defendant was overtaking stationary traffic at up to 20 miles per hour and had no effective opportunity to avoid the collision.

HHJ Hamilton in Luton County Court dismissed the negligence claim. He found that the defendant had driven negligently but that her negligence had not caused the injuries. Contingently, he assessed the claimant’s contributory negligence at 75 per cent.

The claimant appealed on causation. The central issue was whether the defendant’s manner of driving could constitute a material cause of an accident which became unavoidable only when the claimant stepped into the vehicle’s path.

1. Appeal dismissed. May LJ, with whom Sir Peter Gibson agreed, held that the County Court judge reached the correct substantive result, although his separation of breach and causation had produced a technically inconsistent finding.

2. Negligence is a composite concept. Although it is convenient to analyse duty, breach, causation and damage separately, the essential inquiry is whether the scope of the duty owed in the particular relationship extends to protecting the claimant from the kind of damage actually sustained. That inquiry subsumes causation. The principles stated in S v Gloucestershire County Council [2001] Fam 3013, Caparo [1990] AC 605 and Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 applied to physical injury as well as economic loss.

3. The judge should therefore not have found that the defendant was negligent but that her negligence did not cause the accident. On the primary findings, the defendant owed no duty to drive in a manner capable of avoiding the injury which actually occurred. Possible negligence capable of injuring another person under hypothetical circumstances could not establish a breach of duty owed to this claimant.

4. The claimant stepped into the Landrover’s path when it was level, or almost level, with the stationary van. The defendant then had no opportunity to avoid the collision, whatever reasonable speed she had been travelling. Requiring her to proceed at one or two miles per hour, or otherwise to ensure that she could avoid such an accident, would impose an unattainable standard of perfection.

5. The claimant’s own negligence was the entire cause of her injuries. It was unnecessary to determine the respondent’s notice or revisit the contingent apportionment of contributory negligence. Costs of the appeal were assessed at £7,000, and permission to appeal was refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The claimant’s appeal was dismissed. The court corrected the technical characterisation of the defendant’s conduct but upheld the dismissal of the claim.

2. Luton County Court: HHJ Hamilton dismissed the negligence claim on 18 February 2005 because the defendant’s driving had not caused the claimant’s injuries. He contingently assessed the claimant’s contributory negligence at 75 per cent.