Damian Thomas Sip v Adrian Marsh & Anor

In assessing negligence in a road-traffic accident, duty, breach and causation are component parts of a single inquiry. The question is whether the defendant owed a duty to avoid the injury which in fact occurred. A reasonably careful driver is judged by common sense and experience of how other road users are likely to behave, not by the standards of an ideal driver or with hindsight. A driver is not negligent merely because, when confronted with an emergency created by another’s dangerous driving, the driver chooses an option which later appears less favourable. Where the claimant’s conduct creates a danger that was not reasonably foreseeable, the defendant may owe no duty in relation to the injury actually sustained. The appeal was dismissed.

The claimant appealed against the decision of His Honour Judge Glen in the County Court at Southampton dated 9 April 2024, which dismissed his claim arising from a collision between his motorcycle and a van driven by the first defendant. The trial concerned liability only, and the factual findings were not challenged.

The claimant was travelling at grossly excessive speed when the van emerged from a business entrance. The central issue was whether the first defendant had been negligent in stopping 2 to 2.5 metres before the give-way lines and then commencing the manoeuvre, and whether that positioning caused or materially contributed to the collision.

1. Appeal dismissed. The judge’s conclusion that the first defendant bore no liability for the accident was upheld.
2. Negligence is a composite concept. Duty, breach, causation and damage should not be treated as wholly separate inquiries. The relevant question was whether the relationship between the parties imposed a duty to avoid the injury which actually occurred. Applying Sam v Atkins, if the defendant’s acts or omissions did not cause the damage relied upon, there was no negligence in relation to that damage.
3. The standard was that of a reasonably careful driver with common sense and experience of how other road users were likely to behave. A driver had to take reasonable precautions where a real risk of danger would have been reasonably apparent, but was not required to take extraordinary precautions against a mere possibility. The driver was not judged as an ideal driver or with the benefit of hindsight. The court also applied the guidance in AB v Main.
4. The first defendant’s decision to stop short of the give-way lines was part of a continuing manoeuvre requiring reassessment up to the point of entry onto the major road. He had no reason reasonably to expect a motorcycle travelling at the claimant’s grossly excessive speed. He proceeded slowly and carefully, and there was no reasonably foreseeable danger to the claimant in doing so. The first defendant therefore owed no duty to avoid the injury caused by the claimant’s speed.
5. The causation case also failed. The relevant circumstances were those existing when the van crossed the give-way lines, when it appeared safe to proceed. The alternative reconstruction depended on speculative assumptions and unwarranted precision. The court applied the caution against treating split-second decisions and evidential estimates as determinative, reflected in Clayton v Lambert.
6. The sole cause of the accident was the claimant’s grossly excessive speed.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division): appeal against the decision of His Honour Judge Glen dated 9 April 2024 dismissed.
• County Court at Southampton: liability claim dismissed at trial on the preliminary issue of liability.