Lambert v Clayton

A motorist’s negligence must be assessed by the standard of reasonable prudence and competence at the moment of decision. A court must not infer negligence merely because an accident occurred or because, with hindsight, a different response might have avoided it.

A driver who has reasonably begun a manoeuvre and is then confronted with an emergency is not negligent if an instinctive split-second choice does not fall below that standard. Although an oncoming vehicle has precedence, reasonable care does not invariably require allowing it to proceed without slowing down, particularly where slow vehicles must use a country road.

The appellant drove a pickup truck towing a cattle trailer into a lane across the path of an oncoming motorcycle. The motorcycle came over a blind summit at an excessive speed, collided with the vehicles and its rider was killed.

In Leeds County Court, HH Judge Behrens held the appellant liable, subject to a 75% deduction for the deceased’s contributory negligence. The appellant contended that, after the motorcycle appeared, his decision to accelerate and complete the turn rather than abort it was not negligent.

The central issue was whether that split-second decision fell below the standard expected of a reasonably prudent and competent driver.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. The judge’s order was set aside. The appellant was not negligent.

2. The applicable standard was reasonable prudence and competence. The appellant had reasonably begun the turn after seeing no oncoming traffic. When the motorcycle appeared, he had already applied acceleration and some right-hand steering lock. He had to react largely instinctively and could not immediately assess that the motorcycle was travelling at an abnormal speed.

3. The first-instance judge identified no defect in the appellant’s lookout, speed, decision to begin the turn, or line of travel. The sole criticism was his choice to continue rather than abort the manoeuvre. That conclusion required reasons addressing the situation as it appeared at the time, not the eventual outcome. The judge had not resolved which abortive manoeuvre was required, whether it was feasible, or whether it would probably have prevented the collision.

4. The appellant owed a duty to take reasonable care and to give an oncoming vehicle precedence. That duty did not necessarily require allowing the motorcycle to proceed unimpeded at very high speed. It was not necessarily negligent for a slow vehicle on a country road to require another road user to slow down.

5. The collision did not itself establish negligence. Even if another choice might have avoided it, the appellant’s reaction did not fall below the required standard. The overwhelming cause was the deceased’s excessive speed over a blind summit and his failure to brake or take avoiding action after the vehicles became visible.

Lady Justice Smith also observed, expressly obiter, that fact-finders should avoid unwarranted precision in reconstructing uncertain events from sparse evidence. Where inherent uncertainty prevents proof on the balance of probabilities, the party bearing the burden of proof may fail.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appeal in [2009] EWCA Civ 237 and set aside the order below.
• Leeds County Court: HH Judge Behrens held the defendant liable for the fatal road accident, subject to a 75% deduction for the deceased’s contributory negligence.