Linda Taylor & Anor v David Raspin

A driver emerging from a minor road onto a major road owes a continuing duty to traffic on the major road. Whether that duty requires a further observation depends on the circumstances, including visibility, traffic flow, and the driver’s position and speed. Where visibility is restricted and the driver proceeds slowly into the path of approaching traffic, a second look may be required. Causation is assessed by asking whether that precaution would probably have avoided the collision. Clear eyewitness evidence should remain central in road-traffic cases. Expert evidence may test that evidence, but should not become a rigid mathematical framework for judging the driver’s conduct.

David Raspin brought a personal-injury claim against Linda Taylor arising from a collision between his motorcycle and her car on 11 August 2019. Taylor’s car emerged from a minor road and turned right onto the major road, where it collided with the motorcycle. The first-instance judge found Taylor negligent, Raspin contributorily negligent by 45 per cent, and entered judgment on liability accordingly. Taylor appealed, arguing that she owed no duty to look left for a second time and, alternatively, that any breach was not causative. The appeal also concerned the significance of the motorcycle’s speed and the eyewitness and expert evidence.

1. Appeal dismissed. The judge was entitled to find that Taylor owed a continuing duty to traffic on the major road and, given the regular flow of traffic, the restricted view caused by the bend and her slow progress, should have looked left again before entering the far carriageway.
2. The duty was not a general obligation to keep the major road clear. It required Taylor not to drive into the path of approaching traffic. Evidence that some drivers would have accepted the available gap did not determine what a reasonable driver should have done. General behavioural evidence could not establish the legal standard of care.
3. The findings were sufficient to establish causation. Taylor took about five seconds to reach the collision point at about 5 mph. The motorcycle would have taken about three seconds to travel from the point at which it first became visible. Taylor had not yet entered its path when it should have been seen and had time to stop without materially encroaching into the far carriageway. This was not a split-second decision or an agony-of-the-moment case.
4. The judge’s mistaken treatment of the counterclaim did not undermine his reasoning on primary liability or causation. The error concerned only the effect of the 45 per cent apportionment on the counterclaim.
5. Although unnecessary to the decision, the court observed that the lay eyewitness evidence should have been the central focus. Expert evidence was useful to test the factual evidence, particularly on speed, but should not be elevated into a mathematically precise framework. The court agreed with the proposition stated in Stewart v Glaze.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal from the judgments and order of Upper Tribunal Judge Ward sitting as a High Court judge. The appeal was dismissed.
• High Court, Kings Bench Division, Leeds District Registry: judgment for David Raspin on his personal-injury claim, subject to 45 per cent contributory negligence; judgment for Linda Taylor on the counterclaim to the extent of 45 per cent of its value.