Stewart v Glaze

A driver is judged by the standard of the reasonable driver, viewed in the practical circumstances confronting the driver. The court must avoid hindsight, counsels of perfection and mathematical assumptions about what might theoretically have been possible.

A driver who maintained a proper lookout and drove at about the speed limit was not negligent when an intoxicated pedestrian suddenly ran diagonally into the vehicle’s path, leaving about one second for a response. Accident reconstruction evidence could assist with reaction times and stopping distances, but could not determine negligence. Where a claimant alleges that an impact at a lower but still appreciable speed would have caused less serious injury, specialist medical evidence will usually be required.

The claimant suffered catastrophic head injuries and entered a persistent vegetative state after being struck by the defendant’s car. Liability was tried as a preliminary issue. The claimant alleged that the defendant should have avoided the collision or reduced his speed sufficiently to lessen the injuries.

The principal questions were whether the defendant fell below the standard of the reasonable driver, whether any breach caused the injuries, and, alternatively, how responsibility should be apportioned for contributory negligence. The evidence included eyewitness accounts and accident reconstruction evidence concerning the claimant’s movement, the vehicle’s speed, reaction time and stopping distance.

1. The claim was dismissed. The defendant did not fall below the standard of the reasonable driver. The claimant suddenly ran diagonally from a bus stop into the road and towards the vehicle. The defendant had no reason to brake while the claimant remained on the pavement. Once the claimant entered the road, the defendant had only about one second in which to react. His attempt to swerve was an adequate response in the circumstances: paras [71]–[84], [95].

2. The reasonable-driver standard must reflect practical driving realities. It must not be replaced by the standard of an ideal driver or assessed through hindsight. A theoretical possibility that the defendant might have stopped did not establish that reasonable care required him to do so. The indicative timings supplied by the experts could not properly be treated as a mathematically precise framework for deciding negligence: paras [72]–[83].

3. Accident reconstruction experts may supply scientific criteria outside ordinary judicial knowledge and test the factual evidence and permissible inferences. They must not decide the credibility of eyewitnesses, determine primary facts or express conclusions on negligence. Those matters remain for the court: paras [8]–[10].

4. The alternative causation case also failed. Even if braking could have reduced the vehicle’s speed to about 13.5 mph, there was no cogent evidence that the claimant would probably have suffered different or lesser injuries. An engineer’s generalisations could not replace specialist medical evidence about the effect of a lower-speed collision, particularly where the pedestrian was running towards the vehicle. Any conclusion would have been speculative: paras [85]–[90], [95].

5. Had the defendant been negligent, responsibility would have been apportioned 25% to him and 75% to the claimant. Although apportionment ordinarily favours a pedestrian over the driver of a potentially dangerous vehicle, this was the exceptional case of an adult pedestrian deliberately and inexplicably moving into the path of an oncoming car while intoxicated: paras [91]–[94], [96].

The claim was determined at first instance. By an order dated 1 May 2008, a District Judge directed that liability be tried as a preliminary issue. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.