Sinclair v Joyner

A motorist must take reasonable care in assessing and responding to hazards presented by vulnerable road users. The duty does not impose a counsel of perfection, but it requires the motorist to anticipate an apparent risk and take reasonable steps to avoid it. Where a cyclist is riding close to the centre of a narrow road, standing on the pedals and appearing uncomfortable, the prudent response may be to stop and allow the cyclist to pass safely. A collision may demonstrate that the assumed passing margin was inadequate. Contributory negligence is assessed by an overall comparison of the parties’ blameworthiness and the causative potency of their conduct. Failure to wear a cycle helmet does not establish contributory negligence without evidence that it worsened the injuries.

The claimant suffered catastrophic injuries when her bicycle came into contact with the defendant’s Volvo on a narrow rural road. The defendant accepted that contact had occurred but denied negligence, maintaining that the claimant had lost control and deviated into the car’s path after the car had passed her. The claimant alleged that the defendant failed to keep a proper lookout, failed to recognise the danger presented by the claimant’s position and manner of cycling, and failed to stop when there was time to do so.

The trial concerned liability only, including causation and contributory negligence. The central issues were whether the defendant’s assessment and response to the hazard fell below the standard of the reasonable prudent driver, whether the collision caused the claimant’s fall, and how responsibility should be apportioned.

1. Primary liability. The defendant was required to apply the standard of the reasonable prudent driver in the circumstances. The court rejected any counsel of perfection, but found that the claimant presented a significant and observable hazard: she was cycling very close to the centre of a 2.5-metre carriageway, standing on her pedals and appearing uncomfortable. The Volvo was 2.1 metres wide, leaving an extremely narrow passing margin. The defendant should have recognised the risk that the claimant might deviate from her line.
2. The defendant was not keeping a proper lookout. The parties had at least 60 metres of mutual visibility, yet the defendant said she first saw the claimant only two or three car lengths away and failed to appreciate the indications of difficulty which were apparent to her husband. A reasonable prudent driver would have braked and stopped to allow the claimant to pass. The agreed stopping-distance evidence showed that there was sufficient time and distance to do so.
3. The collision was established on the balance of probabilities. The court accepted the claimant’s reconstruction evidence that the bicycle’s front tyre contacted the Volvo’s rear offside tyre. The glancing impact caused the bicycle to become unstable and deprived the claimant of the opportunity to regain control. The alternative theories of mechanical or health-related causes were speculative and unsupported.
4. The defendant’s reconstruction evidence was given little weight. An accident reconstruction expert’s role is to provide scientific criteria and assistance for interpreting factual evidence, not to determine the facts or speculate about the most likely factual scenario. The court applied the criticisms identified in Liddell v Middleton [1996] PIQR P 36 and Stewart v Glaze [2009] EWHC 704 (QB).
5. The claimant was contributorily negligent because she rode in a central position on the road. Her damages were reduced by 25 per cent. The allegation that failure to wear a helmet constituted contributory negligence was rejected because there was no medical evidence that it aggravated the injuries.