Mitrasinovic v Stroud

In a road-traffic negligence claim, primary factual evidence remains the principal means of determining what occurred. Expert evidence assists by testing that evidence and the inferences drawn from it. It must not be elevated into a rigid mathematical framework against which conduct is judged. Expert opinions based on irrelevant theories are inadmissible. Where the evidence shows that a motorcyclist braked while negotiating a bend, causing the motorcycle to straighten and cross the centre line, and the other driver exercised reasonable care, liability is not established against the other driver.

The claimant, Vladimir Mitrasinovic, was seriously injured when his motorcycle collided with a car driven by Evelyn Stroud on the A413. He alleged that the defendant had cut a right-hand bend and crossed onto the wrong side of the road. The defendant denied negligence and contended that the claimant had braked while negotiating a left-hand bend, causing his motorcycle to straighten and cross the centre lines.

Liability was ordered to be tried as a preliminary issue, comprising primary liability and contributory negligence if appropriate. The central issues were the parties’ positions on the road, the cause and point of impact, and the weight to be given to competing factual and expert evidence.

1. Claim dismissed. The court found that the defendant did not cut the corner or cross the centre line. She exercised the degree of care reasonably expected of a motorist negotiating a sharp right-hand bend.
2. The claimant was riding on the correct side of the road but braked as he approached the bend. This caused the motorcycle to lift and travel straight ahead rather than follow the curve, resulting in the collision. The point of impact was somewhere between the identified road mark and the southernmost chevron.
3. Primary factual evidence was of greatest importance. As observed in Stewart v Glaze [2009] EWHC 704 (QB), expert evidence is a useful means of testing factual evidence and inferences, but must not be treated as a fixed mathematical framework against which a defendant’s conduct is rigidly judged.
4. The expert evidence could not determine why the claimant braked. To the extent that the experts theorised that he reacted to the defendant’s car crossing the centre lines, or had misjudged the bend, those opinions were irrelevant to the issues the court had to decide and were inadmissible.
5. The parties were directed to seek agreement on an order dealing with consequential matters, including costs. If no agreement was reached, written applications could be made within the periods specified by the court.