Sandra Zanatta v Metroline Travel Limited

In a fast-moving road accident, a trial judge may avoid artificially precise findings where forensic and eyewitness evidence is limited. Expert calculations, assumptions and agreement do not make facts common ground or bind the judge. An appellate court should interfere with factual findings only where they are unsupported by evidence or no reasonable judge could have reached them. A professional bus driver owes a duty to take reasonable care, not a counsel of perfection or a guarantee of safety. The duty requires awareness and reasonable anticipation, but the mere presence of an ordinary pedestrian on a pavement does not necessarily require sounding a horn or substantially reducing speed. Liability depends on the circumstances as they developed, including the time available to react and the safety of passengers.

The appellant was struck by a bus while attempting to cross Chamberlayne Road. She brought a negligence claim against the respondent bus operator. At a liability-only trial in the High Court, HHJ Shetty dismissed the claim, finding that the driver had observed the claimant, reacted reasonably as she moved towards the kerb, and applied hard braking and swerved when she entered the road.

The claimant appealed, alleging that the judge disregarded common ground, made impermissibly precise or unsupported findings, and wrongly concluded that the driver had taken reasonable precautions. She also challenged the judge’s provisional assessment of 70% contributory negligence. The central issues were whether the fact-finding process was materially flawed and whether the driver fell below the standard of reasonable care.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the decision of HHJ Shetty.
2. The alleged common ground was not binding. The claimant’s pleaded case did not become accepted merely because she had not served a Reply. Facts assumed or inferred by experts, including matters recorded in a joint statement, remained matters for the judge. The judge was entitled to assess the evidence and to reject precise distances which were not reliably established.
3. In a fast-moving incident with limited forensic and eyewitness evidence, the judge was right to guard against artificial reconstruction and unwarranted precision. That approach was consistent with Clayton v Lambert [2009] EWCA Civ 237. The appellate court also applied the established restraint that it should interfere with factual findings only where they were unsupported by the evidence or no reasonable judge could have reached them, as stated in Haringey LBC v Ahmed & Ahmed [2017] EWCA Civ 1861.
4. The applicable duty was the ordinary duty to take reasonable care. The standard was that of a reasonable bus driver, not a perfect driver, and the court must avoid evaluating the duty with hindsight or turning it into a guarantee of safety. The judge correctly applied the approach in Ahanonu v South East London & Kent Bus Co Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 274.
5. The driver was entitled to observe the claimant, ease off the accelerator, cover and lightly apply the brakes as she moved towards the pavement, and apply hard braking and steer when she stepped into the road. Her presence on the pavement did not itself make her a hazard requiring a horn or a reduction below 20 or 25 mph. The incident developed rapidly, and the claimant’s expert evidence supported the conclusion that a collision was unavoidable at an initial speed of 25 mph or more.
6. As the finding that the driver was not in breach of duty stood, the challenge to contributory negligence did not arise for decision.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed.
• High Court, King’s Bench Division: At a liability-only trial, HHJ Shetty dismissed the negligence claim. He provisionally assessed contributory negligence at 70% if liability had been established.