Ghadami & Anor v Chelmsford Crown Court & Anor

On a licensing appeal heard de novo, the Crown court may exercise the licensing justices’ powers, including power to grant an on-licence subject to a condition requiring structural alterations. An objection notice need not be construed narrowly where it identifies the relevant internal access and the statutory mischief. A reference to a possible offence under section 184 of the Licensing Act 1964 did not confine the objection to proving that offence. The court could therefore consider wider concerns about access between licensed premises and adjoining unlicensed premises and impose a condition requiring a fire door.

The appellants held an on-licence for Bar Vegas, adjoining an amusement arcade. The premises were connected by a hole in the wall. The police objected to renewal, referring to the internal connection and an alleged contravention of section 184 of the Licensing Act 1964. The licensing justices refused renewal.

On a de novo appeal, the Crown court granted the licence subject to a condition that a fire door be installed. The Administrative Court refused permission to seek judicial review. The central issues were whether the Crown court had jurisdiction to impose the condition, whether the objection notice permitted consideration of wider access concerns, and whether the condition required a structural alteration.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellants had to establish an arguable error of law in the Crown court’s decision to obtain judicial review. None was shown.
2. The hearing before the Crown court was de novo. By established practice, it had the full powers of the licensing justices and could make any order they could have made. A plan had in fact been produced and considered, and the use of “may” in section 19(1) of the Licensing Act 1964 meant that production of a plan was not a jurisdictional requirement in every case.
3. The installation of a fire door in the hole was a “structural alteration” within section 19(1). The expression contemplated a physical and permanent alteration, rather than merely regulating use. Smith v Justices of Portsmouth [1906] 2 KB 229 supported that construction.
4. The police objection was not confined to proving a criminal offence under section 184. Read in light of the statutory purpose, the reference to the internal door and section 184 identified the mischief and permitted the police to raise the general concern about access between the licensed premises and the adjoining amusement arcade. The notice should not be narrowly construed. This approach was supported by R v Justices of Miskin Higher [1893] 1 QB 275.
5. It was unnecessary to decide whether section 184 applied to a pre-existing internal communication. The point had not been fully argued, and the Crown court’s power did not depend on proof of a section 184 offence. Lady Justice Arden provisionally favoured a purposive interpretation that would not make the grant of a licence with a pre-existing communication itself produce an offence, while expressing no final view.

Costs were summarily assessed at £5,015. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2005] EWCA Civ 1534. Appeal dismissed; costs summarily assessed at £5,015 and permission to appeal to the House of Lords refused.
• Administrative Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Stanley Burnton J refused permission to bring judicial review proceedings against the Crown court’s decision and refused permission to appeal against that order.
• Crown court: Allowed the licensing appeal to the extent of granting the on-licence subject to a condition requiring installation of a fire door.
• Licensing justices: Refused renewal of the on-licence after upholding the police objection.