C V Scheepvaartonderneming Flintermar v Sea Malta Company Ltd

Under a time charter, hatch handling is ordinarily the owners’ primary responsibility because the hatch is vessel equipment. That responsibility can nevertheless fall within charterers’ cargo operations where, applying the practical approach in [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 464, the operation is an integral part of those operations under an agreement between the parties.

Clauses making charterers responsible for cargo operations require their stevedores to execute them with due care. A clause preserving the master’s ultimate responsibility for decisions about loading and discharge does not, without clear words, transfer responsibility for negligent execution by charterers’ stevedores. An unsafe method selected by the master does not defeat a contractual damages claim where the stevedores’ negligence was the effective cause of the injury.

The owners time-chartered the Flintermar to the charterers on the Baltime 1939 form. At Gioia Tauro, the parties’ established accord permitted charterers’ stevedores to use a shore crane to remove and replace hatch pontoons during container operations. While the chief officer detached slings from a replacement pontoon, the crane was negligently lifted and he fell into the hold.

His Honour Judge Hallgarten QC held that the effective cause was the stevedores’ negligence, although the master had adopted an unsafe system of work. He dismissed the owners’ contractual claim because hatch handling was not part of loading or discharge. The owners appealed. The charterers cross-appealed on the construction of the charter and causation.

1. The appeal was allowed unanimously and the cross-appeal dismissed. Rix LJ gave the reasons. Sir Martin Nourse and Waller LJ agreed.
2. Hatch handling was prima facie the owners’ primary responsibility. The hatch was vessel equipment and the charter supplied a gantry crane for its operation. Clause 30, which required customary assistance from officers and crew, was not an exclusive allocation of responsibility. It did not preclude a particular hatch operation from falling within charterers’ responsibility on special facts.
3. Clauses 4 and 13 placed primary responsibility for cargo operations on the charterers. Clause 48 did not reverse that allocation. Properly construed, it preserved the master’s responsibility for deciding the method of loading and discharge, and protected charterers and their observer from liability for advice, recommendations or assistance. It left charterers responsible for negligent execution of cargo operations by their stevedores.
4. The court applied the practical test in The Azuero, [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 464. The replacement of the pontoon was part of the overall cargo operation. It occurred within that operation, was performed by charterers’ stevedores without a separate charge to owners, and was carried out under the parties’ accord. The stevedores remained charterers’ contractors throughout; their status did not change with the precise task being performed.
5. The judge’s causation finding stood. The unsafe system selected by the master was not causally effective because, but for the stevedores’ negligent lifting of the crane, the chief officer would not have been injured. The charterers were liable in damages for breach of contract. Judgment was entered for the owners in the sums specified in the order, with interest and costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Allowed the owners’ appeal, dismissed the charterers’ cross-appeal, set aside the relevant parts of the county court order, and entered judgment for the owners: [2005] EWCA Civ 17.
• Central London County Court, Mercantile Court His Honour Judge Hallgarten QC found that charterers’ stevedores had negligently caused the chief officer’s injury, but dismissed the owners’ claim because hatch handling was not part of the charterers’ loading and discharge operations.