Loughran v Pandya

When sentencing for contempt by breach of a court order, the court should determine the length of the committal before deciding whether to suspend it. Seriousness depends on the intrinsic gravity of the contempt and the objectives of marking disapproval and securing future compliance. The court must consider the surrounding context, including aggravating or mitigating features. The maximum term should not be imposed merely because breaches are repeated or serious; it is appropriate only where the contempts are among the most serious. An appellate court should not replace a suspended sentence with a more severe immediate custodial sentence. On the facts, eight months suspended for two years was appropriate.

The appellant had been subject to injunctions restraining violence, harassment, contact with and entry to the respondent’s estate. Of 20 alleged breaches considered by HHJ Zeidman QC in the Edmonton County Court, nine were found proved. The appellant was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years, for contempt of court.

He appealed, arguing that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The respondent submitted that any reduction should be replaced by immediate custody. The appeal concerned the appropriate length and suspension of the committal, and whether the non-molestation order should continue until further order.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The two-year term was reduced to eight months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years. The suspension period was upheld. The non-molestation order was varied so that it also continued until further order.
2. The court applied the general considerations identified in Hale v Tanner [2002] 2 FLR 879. The length of the committal had to be fixed before considering suspension. Seriousness had to be assessed by reference to the intrinsic gravity of the contempt and the objectives of marking disapproval and securing compliance. The term should bear a proper relationship to the maximum available sentence. Suspension was available in a wider range of circumstances than in criminal cases and was ordinarily an important means of securing compliance. The context, including an intimate relationship and the involvement of children, could aggravate or mitigate the contempt.
3. The breaches were serious and formed a prolonged course of conduct. Their effect on the respondent was grave. Nevertheless, they did not amount to the most serious contempts imaginable, and no violence was involved. The maximum two-year term was therefore wrong, and eight months was appropriate.
4. It would not be right in principle to replace the suspended term with an immediate custodial sentence, since that would impose a more serious sentence than the one imposed below. The court had to assess the appeal on the circumstances existing when the original order was made. Later or further breaches could be dealt with separately and could expose the appellant to activation of the suspended sentence.
5. The appeal was allowed to that extent. There was a detailed assessment of the costs of both parties.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2005] EWCA Civ 1720, the appeal was allowed to the extent indicated. The committal term was reduced and the injunction varied.
2. Edmonton County Court, sitting at Snaresbrook Crown Court: HHJ Zeidman QC found nine of 20 alleged breaches proved and sentenced the appellant to two years’ imprisonment suspended for two years for contempt of court.