Morgan v Southend County Court

[2005] EWCA Civ 1740

Case details

Case citations
[2005] EWCA Civ 1740
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
11 November 2005
Judgment text

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Subjects
Civil procedure Abuse of process Civil restraint orders
Keywords
permission to appeal civil restraint order abuse of process strike out statutory damages Housing Act 1988 orders made without notice application to set aside
Outcome
application refused
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Permission to appeal should be refused where the papers do not disclose an ascertainable viable legal complaint, even though the claimant identifies a statutory cause of action. The existence of statutory rights to damages under sections 12 and 27 of the Housing Act 1988 does not establish that those rights arise on the facts alleged. Where an order was made by the lower court of its own motion and without notice, a party asserting a legitimate complaint should ordinarily apply in that court to set it aside. The appellate court should not decide an unparticularised claim or interfere without a proper basis.

Factual background

Michael Morgan brought proceedings against Basildon Community Housing Association, the Chief Constable of Essex Police and Southend County Court. The claims alleged, among other matters, statutory liability under the Housing Act 1988, tortious wrongdoing and breaches of the Human Rights Act 1998. On 14 September 2005, His Honour Judge MacDuff QC, sitting as a High Court judge, struck out three claims as wholly devoid of merit and an abuse of process, and made a two-year Civil Restraint Order.

Morgan sought permission to appeal. The central issue was whether the papers disclosed any viable legal complaint capable of justifying appellate intervention, or whether any legitimate challenge should instead be made to the orders in the County Court.

Held

  1. Application refused. The Court of Appeal found nothing to justify interference with the orders made by the High Court. The claim forms and other documents were so unclear that it was impossible to determine whether any viable legal complaint existed.
  2. Morgan relied particularly on sections 12 and 27 of the Housing Act 1988, which concern circumstances in which possession proceedings may have been obtained by misrepresentation, concealment or deceit and may give rise to damages. The court accepted that the Act creates statutory rights to damages. That acceptance did not establish that Morgan’s allegations fell within those provisions or that he had a meritorious claim.
  3. The claims were inadequately particularised. The court was not in a position to decide whether the alleged statutory breaches, deceit, trespass or other torts had occurred. If a legitimate complaint existed, the proper course was to apply in the County Court to set aside the orders, which had been made by the court of its own motion and without notice.
  4. The court expressly made no finding that such an application should succeed, or that the original orders were unjustified. The existing history of restraint orders and apparently abusive proceedings provided further context, but the decisive point was the absence of material establishing a proper basis for appellate intervention. It was therefore the court’s duty to refuse the application. A transcript was ordered to be supplied to the appellant at public expense.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division)[2005] EWCA Civ 1740: application for permission to appeal refused.
  2. High Court — On 14 September 2005, His Honour Judge MacDuff QC struck out the three proceedings as wholly devoid of merit and an abuse of process, and made a two-year Civil Restraint Order.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
application refused

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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