Puffett (a minor) v Hayfield

In a negligence claim arising from a road collision, causation does not depend on identifying a precise maximum safe speed. The question is whether, on the evidence as a whole and on the balance of probabilities, excessive speed probably made a difference to the accident. A judge may consider the time and distance available for braking or reaction, the surrounding risks, the opportunity for evasive action, and the possibility that a person entering the road could avoid the vehicle if it were travelling more slowly. An exact finding on one variable, such as the point of emergence or the non-negligent speed, is not essential where the overall evidence supports causation.

A six-year-old child was seriously injured after running into the road and being struck by a car driven by the appellant. The road was a residential cul-de-sac with parked vehicles leaving a narrow passage. The Southend County Court found that the appellant had been driving too fast and that the excessive speed caused the accident. Judgment was entered for the claimant on liability, with damages assessment deferred.

The appeal challenged causation. The appellant argued that the child had emerged unexpectedly, that the precise point of emergence was unknown, and that the judge had not identified a non-negligent or maximum safe speed. The central issue was whether causation could properly be found without those specific findings.

Lord Justice Pill gave the leading judgment. Lord Justice Keene and Lord Justice Lloyd agreed.

1. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed. The finding of liability was upheld, with costs subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.
2. Causation. Where excessive speed is the only finding of negligence, the law does not require the judge to identify a precise maximum safe speed before deciding whether the negligence caused the accident. Causation is an overall assessment of the evidence and circumstances on the balance of probabilities.
3. Evidence and variables. The absence of a finding about one variable, including the precise point at which the child emerged, does not prevent a causation finding. Relevant considerations included the likelihood of children playing in the road, the narrow passage created by parked vehicles, the limited opportunity for evasive action, the greater reaction time at a lower speed, and the possibility that the child could have taken evasive action. A lower speed could be causative even if the driver could not necessarily have stopped before impact.
4. Authorities. The approach in Wright v Freeway Haulage Ltd (transcript 22nd April 1999) and Lamoon v Fry ([2004] EWCA Civ 591) supported assessing the practical effect of lower speed without requiring a precise safe-speed finding. The principle in Baker v Market Harborough Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd ([1953] 1 WLR 1472) that a reasonable and probable inference may be drawn from the facts was sound and relevant, although the factual comparison did not assist further.
5. Application. The trial judge had sufficient material to conclude that the appellant’s excessive speed caused the collision. The Court added that, on the evidence, a finding that 15 miles per hour was a maximum safe speed would have been open to the judge, but the failure to make that finding caused no injustice.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2005] EWCA Civ 1760, dismissed the appeal against the liability judgment, with costs subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.
2. Southend County Court: His Honour Judge Yelton found the appellant liable on 26 April 2005. Assessment of damages was deferred.