Daie, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Camden Homeless Persons' Unit

On a procedural application arising from a homelessness decision, the Court of Appeal may determine permission immediately where the issue is sufficiently focused and should not be adjourned merely to allow further preparation. Where later material reveals an arguable question of law, the court may grant permission to apply for judicial review and make consequential interim and case-management orders. A local authority’s refusal to consider a fresh homelessness application because there has been no material change in circumstances may require review where the wording of its decision arguably does not reflect the approach stated in a later Court of Appeal authority.

Dr Daie sought to challenge Camden’s refusal to consider a fresh homelessness application. The High Court, before Hodge J, had given an unapproved judgment on 7 March 2004. An earlier permission application had been adjourned by Keene LJ. The Court of Appeal then saw Camden’s letter dated 6 October 2004, which had not been before Keene LJ, and considered whether its wording was satisfactory in light of the later decision in London Borough of Tower Hamlets v Rikha Begum [2005] EWCA Civ 340. The central issue was whether the matter disclosed an arguable question of law warranting permission for judicial review.

1. Disposition. The application for an adjournment was refused. The Court of Appeal granted permission to apply for judicial review, rather than permission to appeal, under CPR 52.15(3).
2. Arguable legal issue. Camden’s letter of 6 October 2004 refused to consider a fresh application because the authority was not satisfied that there had been a material change in circumstances since the earlier decision that Dr Daie was not homeless. The court considered that this formulation was arguably inconsistent with the way the matter had been put by the Court of Appeal in London Borough of Tower Hamlets v Rikha Begum [2005] EWCA Civ 340. That provided sufficient reason to grant permission so that the legal issue could be considered.
3. Procedural management. The court declined to defer the decision, although Dr Daie sought an adjournment to prepare a skeleton argument and had not seen the unapproved transcript relied upon. Since permission was granted on a question of law, the court hoped that he would obtain legal assistance.
4. Interim and consequential orders. Camden was ordered to continue providing temporary accommodation until the judicial review hearing. The judicial review was expedited. Dr Daie was to serve a skeleton argument by 11 April and Camden was to serve its skeleton argument within seven days thereafter. The costs of the application were reserved to the judicial review proceedings.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The court considered an application arising from the unapproved judgment of Hodge J in the Administrative Court dated 7 March 2004. An earlier permission application had been adjourned by Keene LJ. The present court refused a further adjournment and granted permission to apply for judicial review under CPR 52.15(3).