London Borough of Tower Hamlets v Begum

A local housing authority must entertain a subsequent homelessness application where the application and accompanying documents disclose a new fact which is neither trivial nor fanciful. It is insufficient to ask whether there has been a material change of circumstances.

The authority must compare the disclosed facts with the circumstances known when the earlier application was decided or reviewed. If the applications are based on exactly the same facts, the later application may be rejected as ineffective. Otherwise, the statutory inquiry duties under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 apply. The authority cannot investigate the truth of apparently material new facts before deciding whether the application is valid.

The respondent had previously been accepted as unintentionally homeless and in priority need. The appellant council discharged its duty after she refused an offer of accommodation which was found suitable. She later applied again after returning to an overcrowded family home, relying principally on two brothers having moved into the property, one of whom was addicted to heroin.

The council rejected the second application because it considered that there had been no material change of circumstances. His Honour Judge Hornby quashed that decision but made no order for costs. The council appealed and the respondent cross-appealed on costs.

The central issue was whether Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 permitted a material-change threshold or required the council to perform its statutory duties unless the later application was based on exactly the same facts as the earlier application.

1. The council’s appeal was dismissed and the cross-appeal on costs was allowed. Neuberger LJ, with whom Keene LJ agreed, held that the second application was valid. The review decision was correctly quashed. Pill LJ agreed in the disposition.
2. Sections 183(1) and 184(1) of the Housing Act 1996 require an authority to make the prescribed inquiries once there is a genuine application and reason to believe that the applicant is or may be homeless or threatened with homelessness. No additional requirement that the applicant establish a material change of circumstances can be implied. The reasoning in R v Harrow London Borough Council, Ex p Fahia [1998] 1 WLR 1396 applies equally to the 1996 Act.
3. A purported subsequent application may be rejected as ineffective where it is based on exactly the same facts as the earlier application. The authority must compare the circumstances known when the earlier application was decided, or reviewed, with the facts disclosed in the later application and its accompanying material. This comparison does not authorise a preliminary investigation into the truth of apparently new facts.
4. The applicant must identify the alleged new facts. An authority may reject the application where none is identified, or where the alleged facts are already known not to be new, or are fanciful or trivial. If apparently new, non-trivial and non-fanciful facts are disclosed, the authority must accept the application as valid and undertake the statutory inquiries, even if those facts may later prove inaccurate or insufficient.
5. The birth of the respondent’s second child was not new because it had been considered when the earlier accommodation was offered. The subsequent residence of two brothers, including one with a heroin addiction, meant that the applications were not identical. The council therefore had to entertain the second application.
6. Whether the respondent was intentionally homeless remained for the council to determine under the statutory procedure. It was inappropriate to anticipate that decision when determining costs. Even an eventual finding of intentional homelessness would not make her success pyrrhic because she could obtain interim accommodation, advice and assistance, and housing-allocation preference.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The council’s appeal was dismissed. The respondent’s cross-appeal was allowed, and she was awarded her costs below on the standard basis.
2. Bow County Court: His Honour Judge Hornby allowed the respondent’s appeal and quashed the council’s review decision, but made no order for costs.
3. Local authority review: The council confirmed its refusal to entertain the second application because it found no material change of circumstances.