Angela Lewis, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Southwark

A communication from a local housing authority is not a reviewable decision merely because it records the authority’s understanding of a claimant’s historical housing status. Its substance and statutory context must be considered.

A Part 7 homelessness application need not take a particular form. A Part 6 housing application, combined with surrounding circumstances giving the authority reason to believe that the applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness, may constitute a Part 7 application.

However, no statutory homelessness duty arises where the authority’s assistance prevents homelessness before the application is determined. The exception permitting assessment by reference to earlier circumstances applies only where an unlawful act deprived the applicant of an accrued right or benefit.

The claimant challenged three communications from Southwark in November 2024 and February 2025. She contended that they decided, or confirmed, that she had not made a homelessness application in March 2012 and that no housing duty had arisen.

In March 2012, after the lawful discharge of an earlier main housing duty, the claimant attended an advice and assistance interview and submitted a Part 6 housing application. The authority then facilitated an assured shorthold tenancy which began before her existing accommodation ended.

The issues were whether the communications were amenable to judicial review, whether the March 2012 events constituted a Part 7 application, whether any statutory duty arose, and whether the claimant’s circumstances in 2012 should govern the decision.

1. The claim was dismissed. Emails 1 to 3 recorded the authority’s understanding of past events and the claimant’s status. They did not constitute an evaluative determination of a 2012 homelessness application. The true challenge concerned events in 2012 and was therefore subject to the principles governing delay and public administration.
2. The March 2012 visit and the Housing List Application Form objectively constituted a fresh application for assistance under Part 7. An application need not use a prescribed form. Information supplied for a Part 6 allocation application may trigger Part 7 where it gives the authority reason to believe that the applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness.
3. The authority consequently erred in failing to recognise that an application had been made and in failing to consider its statutory consequences. It might have lawfully declined to accept the application as based on the same facts as the earlier application, although a change in mental health circumstances might have provided new facts.
4. That error did not result in a statutory duty under sections 188, 193 or 195. The authority’s assistance secured an assured shorthold tenancy before the claimant’s previous tenancy ended. She therefore never became homeless within section 175. Had the accommodation been provided under section 188, occupation of it would not itself have ended homelessness; that was not what occurred.
5. The claimant’s later applications in 2022 and 2024 also superseded any extant 2012 application. An authority cannot owe two different housing duties at the same time.
6. The earlier-date exception in Crawley BC v B, Robinson v Hammersmith & Fulham LBC and Temur v Hackney did not apply. It presupposes an unlawful act which deprived the applicant of a right or accrued benefit. The claimant’s homelessness never materialised, so no such right was lost.

Relief was also refused on delay grounds. The claim concerned events almost 12 years old, and granting relief would prejudice good administration.