Din (Taj) v Wandsworth London Borough Council

Under the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977, intentional homelessness is determined by how the relevant state of homelessness began. Where an applicant deliberately leaves accommodation which was available and reasonable to continue occupying, the disqualification persists while that act remains causally connected to the homelessness relied upon.

A later hypothetical event which would independently have made the applicant homeless by the application date does not extinguish the actual cause. Temporary or precarious accommodation does not of itself break the connection, although settled accommodation may do so. The authority may consider local housing scarcity and competing claims when deciding whether continued occupation was reasonable. Its factual satisfaction is subject to supervisory review for legal error, rather than a merits appeal.

Din (Taj) v Wandsworth London Borough Council concerned a married couple with four children who voluntarily left suitable accommodation after being advised to remain until possession proceedings were brought. They moved into overcrowded, temporary accommodation with a relative and later applied to the borough for housing. The borough accepted that they were homeless and in priority need but determined that they had become homeless intentionally.

Judge White in Wandsworth County Court declared the determination void, awarded damages and ordered the borough to secure accommodation. The Court of Appeal, by a majority, reversed that order: [1981] 3 WLR 918. The central issue before the House was whether the original intentional departure remained legally relevant where the applicants would, by the application date, have lost their former accommodation in any event.

1. Appeal dismissed by a majority of three to two. Lord Wilberforce, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton and Lord Lowry held that the borough was entitled to determine that the appellants became homeless intentionally. Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Bridge of Harwich dissented.
2. Per Lord Wilberforce, supported on the decisive construction by Lord Fraser and Lord Lowry, the repeated use of the word became in the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 directed attention to how and when the relevant homelessness began. The appellants deliberately ceased to occupy accommodation which was available and which the authority was entitled to regard as reasonable for them to continue occupying. Their departure therefore satisfied section 17(1).
3. Lord Fraser and Lord Lowry accepted that the deliberate act must remain causally connected to the homelessness relied upon. That connection existed because the appellants' actual homelessness originated in their voluntary departure and had not been displaced by settled accommodation. Lord Wilberforce likewise held that a later hypothetical eviction did not supersede the earlier actual cause. The question was why the applicants became homeless, not whether another event would have made them homeless by the date of application.
4. Per Lord Wilberforce, Lord Fraser and Lord Lowry, temporary or precarious accommodation did not displace the original disqualification. The majority approved the limited principle illustrated by Dyson v Kerrier District Council [1980] 1 WLR 1205, while rejecting the argument that a hypothetical later cause extinguished an existing actual cause. Obtaining settled accommodation could break the connection.
5. Lord Fraser held that section 17(4) permitted the borough to consider acute local housing scarcity and its obligations to other families when deciding whether continued occupation was reasonable. Lord Wilberforce and Lord Lowry similarly emphasised that the Act balanced the claims of competing applicants and did not justify departing from its plain language.
6. Per Lord Wilberforce and Lord Lowry, the statutory words requiring the authority to be satisfied entrusted the factual determination to the authority. Judicial control was supervisory and extended to legal error or the absence of material capable of supporting the decision. Lord Wilberforce reserved the validity of using a county court action to obtain substantially the same relief as judicial review because that procedural issue had not been challenged.
7. Lord Russell and Lord Bridge dissented. They would have asked whether the applicants' homelessness at the application date was still attributable to the premature departure. Because eviction from the former accommodation would by then have been inevitable, they considered the earlier cause spent and would have restored the county court's order.

• House of Lords: By a majority of three to two, dismissed the appeal and left standing the Court of Appeal's reversal of the county court order: [1983] 1 AC 657.
• Court of Appeal: By a majority, allowed the borough's appeal and reversed Judge White's order: [1981] 3 WLR 918.
• Wandsworth County Court: Judge White found for the applicants, awarded damages, declared the borough's determination void and ordered it to secure accommodation for the family, subject to a stay pending appeal.