Emilia Munemo v The City of Wolverhampton Council

Under section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996, availability and reasonableness are generally assessed when the applicant ceased to occupy the accommodation. The decision-maker must not use moment-specific blinkers: relevant information before and after that event may be considered. The applicant cannot rely on the deliberate act that caused the loss to show that the accommodation was unavailable or unreasonable.

A secure tenancy obtained by deception remains effective until a possession order is executed. A possession order under Ground 5 of Schedule 2, which requires reasonableness, does not itself make continued occupation unreasonable. Chishimba is confined to its materially different combination of ineligibility and a non-secure tenancy.

Ms Munemo held a secure tenancy of a Birmingham flat but did not disclose it when applying to the Council for homelessness assistance. She obtained an introductory tenancy of a house in Wolverhampton, which later became secure. The Council obtained possession under Ground 5 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985 after establishing that the tenancy had been induced by her false statement, and she was evicted.

Following a further homelessness application, the Council decided that she was intentionally homeless from the Wolverhampton property. Its review decision upheld that conclusion. The County Court at Wolverhampton allowed her statutory appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 and quashed the review decision, relying on Chishimba and Gliddon.

The Council appealed on whether deception made continued occupation unreasonable and whether the review decision gave adequate reasons.

Stuart-Smith LJ gave the leading judgment, with Cobb and Phillips LJJ agreeing. The appeal was allowed on both grounds and the Council’s review decision of 11 July 2024 was restored.

1. Section 191(1) framework. The six-question inquiry asks whether there was a deliberate act or omission, whether it was by the applicant, whether it caused cessation of occupation, whether it remained an operative cause of present homelessness, whether the accommodation was available, and whether it would have been reasonable to continue occupying it. The first four questions were clearly satisfied. The false statements induced the grant of the tenancy and, through the statutory possession process, remained an operative cause of the eviction. Whether the applicant might otherwise have been eligible for the accommodation was irrelevant to those questions. The court applied Waltham Forest LBC v Roberts [2004] EWCA Civ 940.
2. Timing and reasonableness. Questions of availability and reasonableness are directed to the time when the applicant ceased occupation, as recognised in Din (Taj) v Wandsworth LBC [1983] 1 AC 657 and Haile v Waltham Forest LBC [2015] UKSC 34. That does not require a review officer to disregard relevant information before or after that moment. The approach in Denton v Southwark LBC [2007] EWCA Civ 623 was reformulated: an applicant may not rely on the causative deliberate act or omission to establish that the accommodation was unavailable or unreasonable. The discussion of section 177(1) of the Housing Act 1996 in LB v Tower Hamlets LBC [2020] EWCA Civ 439 supported the same approach.
3. Secure tenancy and deception. A secure tenancy obtained by fraud is neither void nor voidable before possession is recovered. The landlord must use the statutory possession route, and a possession order under Ground 5 must be reasonable and proportionate. The principles in Islington LBC v Uckac [2006] EWCA Civ 340 and the authorities concerning the statutory reasonableness requirement therefore applied.
4. Chishimba and Gliddon. Chishimba v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC [2013] EWCA Civ 786 rested on the applicant’s ineligibility for assistance and the fact that she had only a non-secure tenancy without any lawful right to occupy. Those features were fundamental and were absent here. The sweeping statement in R v Exeter City Council ex p Gliddon [1985] 1 All ER 493 was likewise inapposite to a secure tenancy. Ignoring the misrepresentation, the Wolverhampton property was suitable, available and reasonable to occupy. Extending Chishimba would undermine the purpose of section 191.
5. Reasons. The reviewing officer’s statement and the review decision adequately addressed the new argument. A witness need not address purely legal submissions, which are the province of counsel, provided the reviewing officer’s legal approach is sound. Ground 2 therefore failed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2026] EWCA Civ 329, the Council’s appeal was allowed on both grounds and the review decision of 11 July 2024 was restored.
• County Court at Wolverhampton (sitting at Walsall): HHJ Grimshaw, judgment dated 31 January 2025, allowed Ms Munemo’s statutory appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 and quashed the Council’s review decision.