Waltham Forest v Roberts

A false statement induces the grant of a secure tenancy under Ground 5 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985 if it plays a real and substantial part in the landlord’s decision. It need not be the sole or decisive cause. Materiality is the appropriate starting point, and a materially false statement may support an inference of inducement.

Entitlement to housing benefit must be determined through the prescribed statutory scheme. A county court hearing possession proceedings cannot substitute its own determination of entitlement for an operative decision made under that scheme.

Even where a possession ground is established, the court must consider all relevant circumstances when deciding reasonableness. No single circumstance is ordinarily determinative.

The local housing authority sought possession of a dwelling let to the tenant under a secure tenancy. It relied on Grounds 1 and 5 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985. Ground 1 concerned rent arrears arising after housing benefit was withdrawn. Ground 5 concerned a false answer in the tenant’s housing application about property ownership.

The Recorder held that the tenant had deliberately made a false statement but that it had not induced the grant of the tenancy. He also held that the authority had wrongly denied housing benefit and therefore rejected the rent-arrears ground. He would in any event have considered possession unreasonable.

The authority appealed on questions of law. The central issues were the proper test for inducement, the county court’s power to determine housing-benefit entitlement, and the appropriate disposal of the reasonableness question.

1. Appeal allowed on both possession grounds. A landlord relying on Ground 5 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985 must prove that the false statement induced the grant of the tenancy. The statement need not have been the sole or decisive cause. It is enough that it played a real and substantial part in the decision and operated as one of the inducing causes.

2. The Recorder erred by effectively requiring evidence from the actual decision-maker and by asking what would really have happened had the truth been disclosed. There is no strict evidential requirement to call the individual decision-maker. Evidence about the authority’s allocation policy and the inquiries which disclosure would have generated was admissible and material.

3. Materiality is a useful starting point when deciding inducement. A false statement on a material matter is likely to have influenced the representee and may support a fair factual inference of inducement. Property ownership was plainly material to a housing application. On the Recorder’s findings, the false answer was deliberately designed to avoid inquiries. Applying the correct approach, the authority was bound to succeed under Ground 5.

4. The prescribed housing-benefit scheme was detailed, self-contained and exhaustive. Entitlement depended upon a determination made through that scheme, subject to its review and appeal procedures and the courts’ proper supervisory or appellate jurisdiction. The Recorder could not determine entitlement afresh in possession proceedings merely because he reached a different view about the tenant’s beneficial ownership. The operative benefit decision remained unchallenged, and the rent arrears therefore established Ground 1.

5. The question whether possession was reasonable under section 84(2)(a) required consideration of all relevant circumstances. No single matter was likely to be determinative. Relevant matters could include the history of the benefit appeals, delay, the tenant’s beneficial interest, the consequences of her non-disclosure, her health and age, the current position, and any payment of the arrears following the profitable sale of the property.

6. The reasonableness issue was remitted to a different county court judge for determination on current evidence. Sedley LJ and Peter Gibson LJ agreed with Newman J’s judgment and proposed disposal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the authority’s appeal on Grounds 1 and 5 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985. The question whether possession was reasonable was remitted to a different county court judge.
• Central London Civil Justice Centre: Mr Recorder Barnard QC held that neither possession ground was established and stated that, had a ground been proved, possession would not have been reasonable. No neutral citation is stated.