Oshin v The Royal Borough of Greenwich

For Ground 5 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985, a false statement in a housing application may induce a later tenancy even if an earlier tenancy was granted on the same application. Where a later form amends, rather than replaces, the original form, the documents may be read together. Inducement is a question of fact: the statement must have played a real and substantial part, though need not have been decisive, and must have been one of the inducing causes. Materiality requires relevance to eligibility for social housing, but the statement need not directly determine eligibility. A statement may be material where its context indicates that it will trigger investigation of immigration status.

The respondent local authority sought possession of the appellant’s secure tenancy of Jessup Close under Ground 5 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985. The appellant had made false statements in a 2001 housing application and a 2005 amendment form concerning residence outside the United Kingdom. A Deputy District Judge found that the 2001 statement had induced the grant of the tenancy. HHJ Saunders dismissed the appellant’s appeal.

Permission was granted for a second appeal on two grounds: whether the 2001 statement could induce the later Jessup Close tenancy after the earlier Robert Street tenancy had been granted, and whether the statements were sufficiently material when the authority had not directly asked about immigration status.

The appeal was dismissed. Floyd LJ gave the leading judgment, with Coulson and McCombe LJJ agreeing.

1. Continuing effect of the application. Ground 5 required proof that a false statement induced the grant of the tenancy in issue. The 2005 form was an amendment to the 2001 form, shared its reference number and did not repeat important questions. The two forms therefore formed the factual basis of the application for the Jessup Close tenancy. Nothing in the statutory allocation scheme under sections 159, 166, 166(3), 166A and 166A(14) of the Housing Act 1996 made earlier statements ineffective after the first tenancy had been granted.
2. Inducement. The issue was factual. Applying the approach in Waltham Forest LBC v Roberts [2005] EWCA Civ 940; [2005] H.L.R. 2, the question was whether the false statement played a real and substantial part, although not necessarily a decisive part, in inducing the authority to act. It was sufficient that the statement was one of the inducing causes. The Deputy District Judge was entitled to find that the 2001 statement continued to operate on the authority’s mind.
3. Materiality. A false statement had to be relevant to eligibility for social housing, but it did not need to be directly determinative. Question 10 was headed Immigration Status and directed an applicant who answered affirmatively to complete an Asylum/Immigration Form. The false negative answer was therefore capable of preventing further investigation and was sufficiently material to induce the grant of a tenancy to an ineligible applicant.
4. Other matters. The strict construction approach referred to in Ricketts v Ad Valorem Factors Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1706 did not arise because the issue was not one of doubtful statutory interpretation. Mere non-disclosure would not have been enough, although a representation could be implied; here there was an actual false statement. The possession order therefore stood.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The second appeal was dismissed on 17 March 2020.
2. County Court at Central London: HHJ Saunders dismissed the appellant’s appeal from the possession decision on 30 August 2018.
3. Deputy District Judge: On 13 April 2018, the court found Ground 5 established and made a possession order in respect of Jessup Close.