Watchman v Ipswich Borough Council

For intentional homelessness under section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996, the decision-maker must determine whether the applicant’s deliberate act or omission was a substantial cause of the homelessness when it occurred. The effective cause need not be the event closest in time.

Where several causes may have contributed, the inquiry is fact-sensitive. It should consider whether homelessness was a likely consequence of the applicant’s act, in the light of the statutory purpose of attributing responsibility for homelessness. Earlier financial circumstances may therefore be relevant. A later event may accelerate homelessness without breaking the causal connection.

The appellant and her family bought their former council house with a mortgage despite rent arrears, other debts and mortgage repayments exceeding their former rent. After her husband lost his job, mortgage arrears accrued and the mortgagee obtained possession.

The respondent housing authority decided on review under section 202 of the Housing Act 1996 that the appellant was intentionally homeless. It held that taking the mortgage was the substantial cause of the homelessness and that the husband’s unemployment had accelerated, but had not broken, the causal chain.

HHJ Thompson in Ipswich County Court dismissed the appellant’s section 204 appeal. The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the reviewing officer had asked the wrong causation question or reached an irrational conclusion.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Laws LJ, with whom Carnwath and Moore-Bick LJJ agreed, held that the County Court had correctly found no error of law or irrationality in the review decision.

2. Section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996 directs attention to whether the applicant is responsible for becoming homeless through a deliberate act or omission. In a multiple-cause case, the decision-maker must make a careful judgment on the facts whether homelessness was a likely consequence of that act and whether it was a substantial cause of the homelessness which in fact occurred.

3. The effective cause is not necessarily the chronologically immediate or proximate cause. Causation must be assessed in the purpose and context of the statutory provision. The court should be slow to interfere with an administrative decision on causation except in a clear case.

4. Din v Wandsworth London Borough Council [1983] 1 AC 657 establishes that the time at which homelessness actually occurs is the focus of the inquiry. It does not require the decision-maker to disregard antecedent events, nor does it preclude more than one cause of homelessness.

5. The reviewing officer was entitled to consider the family’s rent record, debts, financial position when the mortgage was assumed, and the likelihood of increased mortgage payments. Those matters rationally supported the conclusion that assuming the mortgage was a substantial cause of the homelessness. The husband’s loss of employment accelerated the process but did not necessarily cause it or break the causal connection.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Dismissed the appellant’s appeal from Ipswich County Court: [2007] EWCA Civ 348.

• Ipswich County Court HHJ Thompson dismissed the appellant’s statutory appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 on 12 May 2006.

• Local housing authority review The respondent’s review decision of 7 March 2006 upheld the finding that the appellant was intentionally homeless.