Sharif v The London Borough of Camden

A housing authority may satisfy its duty under section 176 of the Housing Act 1996 by providing a family with more than one unit of accommodation. The units must be sufficiently close to enable the family to live together in a practical sense. A single unit and shared communal living space are not invariably required.

Whether separate units meet that test is principally a matter of factual judgment for the authority. Its decision remains subject to rationality, reasonableness and proportionality. Accommodation in one or more units must also be suitable and must achieve the statutory objective of enabling genuine family life together.

The local authority accepted a duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 to secure suitable accommodation for Ms Sharif, her father and her sister. It later offered two self-contained rooms on the same floor of a hostel, separated by a few yards. The reviewing officer found the arrangement suitable and concluded that the authority's duty had ended.

The County Court dismissed Ms Sharif's statutory appeal. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision in [2011] EWCA Civ 463, reported at [2011] PTSR 1695, holding that occupation “together with” family members required shared accommodation rather than separate self-contained units without communal living areas.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether section 176 invariably requires a single unit, or permits sufficiently proximate units which enable the family to live together in practical terms.

1. By a majority, the appeal was allowed and the County Court's order restored. Lord Carnwath gave the leading judgment, with which Lord Walker agreed. Lord Hope and Lady Hale agreed that the appeal should be allowed. Lord Kerr dissented.

2. The extended meaning of accommodation “available for occupation”, established by section 176 of the Housing Act 1996, applies throughout Part VII. It requires accommodation which enables the applicant and the relevant members of the household to live together as a family. The purpose does not, however, entail an invariant requirement for a single unit.

3. Per Lord Carnwath, “accommodation” is not synonymous with a unit of accommodation. Section 176 is satisfied by a single unit in which a family can live together, but it may also be satisfied by two units so located that the family can live together in practical terms. The ordinary statutory language neither requires shared communal living space nor makes the presence of separate locks, kitchens or bathrooms decisive. The approach in R v Hillingdon LBC, Ex p Puhlhofer [1986] AC 484 remained authoritative concerning the ordinary meaning of accommodation, subject to the later statutory requirements of reasonableness and suitability.

4. Whether multiple units permit practical family life together is principally a question of fact or factual judgment for the housing authority. Lord Carnwath considered that, short of irrationality, the assessment would be unlikely to raise a question of law. Lord Hope added that the statutory language and the practical ability of the family to live together provide two yardsticks. The test must be applied reasonably and proportionately and must not be exploited.

5. The decision was narrow. It did not give authorities an unrestricted power to disperse families. Accommodation, whether provided in one unit or more, remains unsuitable unless it achieves the fundamental statutory objective of enabling the family genuinely to live together. Lady Hale emphasised that suitability may differ according to the expected duration of occupation, but suitability was no longer in issue in this appeal.

6. Lord Kerr would have dismissed the appeal. In his view, section 176 imposed an objective requirement for accommodation physically capable of occupation by the whole family as a single unit. Mere proximity between separate units could not constitute living together.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: By a majority, allowed the authority's appeal in [2013] UKSC 10 and restored the County Court's order.
2. Court of Appeal: Allowed Ms Sharif's appeal in [2011] EWCA Civ 463, reported at [2011] PTSR 1695, and reversed the County Court. It held that separate self-contained units without shared living areas did not constitute occupation together under section 176 of the Housing Act 1996.
3. London Central County Court: HH Judge Mitchell dismissed Ms Sharif's statutory appeal on 24 June 2010.