AS v London Borough of Camden

Under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996, section 176 imposes a substantive requirement that accommodation be available for occupation by the applicant together with a family member who normally resides with the applicant. It is not merely a direction to assess suitability against the whole household. Two separate self-contained flats, with no shared communal living areas, do not satisfy that requirement, even if they are close and family members may visit and share facilities. The wording reflects Parliament’s policy of keeping families together and is stricter than section 16 of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. Resource constraints cannot justify reducing the issue to a discretionary suitability assessment.

The appellant lived with her father, for whom she acted as carer, and her minor sister. Camden accepted that it owed her the full housing duty under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. After providing temporary accommodation in one house for several years, Camden offered two separate self-contained flats in the same building: one for the appellant and her sister, and one for her father.

The appellant refused the offer. Camden upheld its decision on review and treated its duty as discharged. Her appeal under section 204 was dismissed by His Honour Judge Mitchell in the Central London County Court. The appeal concerned whether two separate units, with no shared communal living areas, could constitute accommodation available for occupation by the household under section 176.

The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal. Lord Justice Etherton gave the judgment, with which Lord Justice Wilson and Lord Justice Jacob agreed.

1. Statutory threshold. Section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 requires the authority to secure accommodation available for occupation by the applicant. Section 176 gives that expression substantive content. It requires accommodation to be available for occupation by the applicant together with a person who normally resides with the applicant as a family member. That requirement operates before, and separately from, the question whether an offer is suitable under sections 193(5) and 206.
2. Meaning of “together with”. On its ordinary meaning, people living in separate self-contained flats, however close, and sharing no communal living areas, do not reside together or occupy accommodation together. Visits and the sharing of facilities do not alter that conclusion.
3. Statutory context. The construction gives effect to the policy of Part 7 to keep families together, identified in Din v Wandsworth LBC [1983] 1 AC 657. Section 176 uses tighter language than section 16 of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977, replacing “and” with “together with” and introducing the concept of a person who “normally resides with” the applicant.
4. Authorities and resources. Ex p. Puhlhofer [1986] AC 486, R v Brent LBC ex p. Awua [1996] AC 55 and Birmingham CC v Ali, Moran v Manchester CC [2009] UKHL 36 concerned the ordinary meaning of “accommodation”; they did not remove the separate statutory requirement in section 176. The observations in Ex p. Surdonja (1999) 31 HLR 686 and R v Lambeth LBC, ex p Ly (1986) 19 HLR 51 were obiter or concerned materially different arrangements and wording. Housing shortages and limited resources could not justify judicial modification of clear statutory language.
5. Disposition. Camden could not discharge its duty by treating the appellant’s refusal of the two flats as a refusal of suitable accommodation under section 193(5).

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — [2011] EWCA Civ 463. Appeal allowed.
2. Central London County Court — His Honour Judge Mitchell dismissed the appellant’s appeal against Camden’s review decision by an order dated 28 June 2010.
3. Camden review decision — On 16 February 2010 Camden upheld its decision that the offered accommodation was suitable and that its housing duty had ended.