Uratemp Ventures Limited v. Collins

For the purposes of section 1 of the Housing Act 1988, a dwelling-house is a place where a person lives and makes a home. A single room may qualify. The availability of cooking facilities is not an essential requirement.

Where the tenant has exclusive possession without shared accommodation, the court asks whether the premises were the tenant’s home when proceedings began. Where the agreement also permits shared use of other rooms, the court must decide whether the exclusively possessed rooms constitute the whole dwelling or only part of it. Courts should apply the ordinary statutory language and avoid converting fact-specific decisions into inflexible rules of law.

The landlord sought possession of a modest hotel room occupied by Mr Collins. The county court dismissed the claim and declared that he held an assured tenancy under section 1(1) of the Housing Act 1988. It found that the room was let as a separate dwelling and that his limited electrical equipment met any requirement for cooking facilities.

A majority of the Court of Appeal held that a room without cooking facilities could not be a dwelling-house. Mance LJ dissented. The House considered whether part of a house can constitute a dwelling when cooking facilities are unavailable or cooking is prohibited.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Millett delivered the principal speech. Lord Irvine LC, Lord Bingham, Lord Steyn and Lord Hobhouse agreed with the proposed disposition and substantially endorsed the ordinary-language approach. The orders of the Court of Appeal were set aside.

2. Per Lord Millett, “dwell” and “dwelling” are ordinary English words referring to the place where a person lives and makes a home. Residential accommodation is a dwelling when it is the occupier’s home or one of the occupier’s homes. It ordinarily connotes settled occupation, including habitual sleeping and usually eating there. Cooking there is unnecessary.

3. Per Lord Bingham and Lord Millett, the question must be determined when proceedings are brought. The court considers the terms of the letting, the premises and the tenant’s use of them. The protective purpose of section 1 of the Housing Act 1988 supports a reasonably generous application to modest rented accommodation.

4. Per Lord Millett, where the tenant has exclusive possession of a house or part of a house without sharing, the decisive question is whether it was the tenant’s home at the relevant date. If the agreement also grants shared use of other rooms, the court asks whether the exclusively possessed rooms are the tenant’s dwelling or merely part of it. Shared occupation of a living room with the landlord may remove statutory protection. A kitchen can be a living room when it can be occupied as such, but limited use of kitchen facilities does not necessarily have that effect.

5. Lord Templeman’s observation in Westminster City Council v Clarke [1992] 2 AC 288 about essential facilities for living, sleeping and cooking was obiter and too restrictive. It did not establish that cooking facilities were indispensable. The earlier sharing cases concerned whether accommodation was a separate dwelling, not whether cooking was inherent in the meaning of “dwelling”.

6. The room was Mr Collins’s home and therefore his dwelling-house. No issue remained for remittal because he had moved rooms by agreement and the parties no longer had a live dispute. The landlord was ordered to pay specified appellate costs.

1. House of Lords: Allowed the appeal unanimously and set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal.
2. Court of Appeal: By a majority, held that the absence of cooking facilities prevented the room from being a dwelling-house. Mance LJ dissented. The court did not remit the tenancy-or-licence issue.
3. West London County Court: Dismissed the landlord’s possession claim and declared that Mr Collins held the room on an assured tenancy under section 1(1) of the Housing Act 1988.