Royal Borough of Windsor & Maidenhead v Smith

When a penal injunction prohibits further “caravans”, the term is construed in its ordinary sense and in the factual context of the order, including the type of caravans already on the site. It is a matter of fact and degree. The term does not extend to every structure adapted for any domestic function, but neither does it require every principal living function to occur within the structure. Although the statutory definition in section 29(1) of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 may apply in an appropriate context, it did not govern this injunction. Because breach could lead to committal, a clear conventional meaning was required. The converted portacabin was not a caravan within the injunction.

The local planning authority sought to commit the respondent for contempt, alleging that she had brought a further caravan onto a Green Belt site in breach of an injunction granted by Mr Justice Nicol on 22 December 2009. The injunction prohibited further caravans, including mobile homes, beyond ten already stationed on the site.

The respondent had brought a wheeled portacabin adapted with windows, a shower, toilet, sink and other utility facilities. Mr Justice Globe dismissed the committal application on 6 December 2011, applying the statutory definition of caravan and finding that the unit was not designed or adapted for human habitation. The appeal concerned whether “caravan” in the injunction had its statutory or ordinary contextual meaning, and whether the unit fell within that meaning.

Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal held that the word “caravans” in the injunction had to be construed in the context of the order and the factual circumstances in which it was made.

1. The proper approach was to begin with the ordinary dictionary meaning of “caravan” and then consider whether the wording and factual context of the injunction indicated a different or more refined meaning. The injunction referred to further caravans beyond the ten already stationed on the site. It therefore referred to the same conventional type of thing, namely mobile dwellings in themselves. The converted portacabin was not fairly describable as a dwelling on wheels and was unlike the existing caravans.
2. “Caravan” and “dwelling” are matters of fact and degree. The court rejected the appellant’s broad submission that any structure containing domestic living space was a caravan. It also rejected an approach requiring every principal living function to take place in the same structure. The absence of anyone currently living in the unit was not decisive, but availability for one element of habitation was insufficient.
3. The statutory definition in section 29(1) of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 did not govern an injunction which was not made under that Act or in connection with planning consent. The reasoning in Wyre Forest District Council for Secretary of State for the Environment [1990] 2 AC 357 was therefore distinguishable. Even if a presumption existed that the statutory definition applied, the injunction and its context disclosed a contrary intention.
4. The penal notice and the possibility of committal made a clear, conventional and readily understandable meaning especially important. The alleged breach had to be proved to the criminal standard, and any uncertainty in the order favoured the respondent. The authority failed to establish contempt.

Patten LJ agreed that the statutory definition and Uratemp Ventures Limited v Collins [2002] 1 AC 301 were unnecessary to the decision. Rix LJ agreed with the dismissal, while observing that the judge’s formulation was too narrow and the appellant’s was too broad. The authority remained able to seek variation of the injunction or a new injunction if wider relief was required.

1. Queen’s Bench Division: Mr Justice Globe dismissed the committal application by order dated 6 December 2011.
2. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): the appeal was dismissed.