Mansfield District Council v Langridge

Statutory secure-tenancy protection cannot be avoided by describing an agreement as a licence or by recording an intention that it should be insecure. Under the Housing Act 1985, a licence falls within the statutory regime where it gives the right to occupy a dwelling-house as a separate dwelling and no statutory exception applies.

Whether accommodation is a separate dwelling requires a contextual assessment, including exclusive possession, sharing, whether it is supplementary to other accommodation, the nature of the premises and the purpose and terms of the arrangement. Temporary duration and an intended return to former accommodation do not prevent separate-dwelling status where the accommodation is self-contained, exclusively occupied and the occupier’s only home.

The council brought possession proceedings concerning Mr Langridge’s secure tenancy of 7 Mappleton Drive. While those proceedings were pending, and while the council resisted his return to that property, it provided him with self-contained accommodation at 30 Willoughby Court under an agreement described as a temporary licence. The agreement expressly stated that it would not create a secure tenancy.

The county court held that the accommodation was not let as a separate dwelling. The High Court dismissed Mr Langridge’s appeal, relying substantially on Tyler v the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (1990) 23 HLR 380. The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the licence nevertheless attracted statutory secure-tenancy protection.

Appeal allowed. Lord Justice Lloyd gave the leading judgment. Sir Peter Gibson and Sir Mark Potter agreed without addition.

1. The parties could not contract out of the secure-tenancy provisions by describing the agreement as a licence or by stating that it was insecure. The question was whether the statutory conditions applied on the facts.
2. The status of the accommodation as a separate dwelling was assessed when the licence came into effect, absent a later contractual variation. The landlord and tenant conditions were tested at the relevant later dates. The landlord condition was satisfied because the landlord was a local authority, and the tenant condition was satisfied because Mr Langridge occupied the premises as his only home.
3. It was immaterial whether the agreement was a tenancy or a licence. Under section 79(3) of the Housing Act 1985, a licence to occupy a dwelling-house as a separate dwelling attracts the statutory regime, unless excluded by Schedule 1. The council’s argument that section 79(3) applied only to licences having the characteristics of tenancies was rejected.
4. The expression separate dwelling requires a contextual assessment. Relevant matters include the subject matter, residential use, exclusive possession, sharing, whether the premises are occupied with or as a supplement to other accommodation, the terms of the agreement, the nature and physical character of the accommodation and the purpose for which it was provided.
5. Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809 did not make independence an additional requirement for a tenancy. Westminster City Council v Clarke [1992] 2 AC 288 supported the importance of exclusive possession. The accommodation in Tyler (1990) 23 HLR 380 was distinguishable because it supplemented premises which the tenant retained and was intended to be used with them. The present accommodation was a temporary substitute, not supplementary accommodation.
6. Although the arrangement was expected to last only about five weeks and Mr Langridge might later return to 7 Mappleton Drive or leave, those matters did not alter the assessment at the start of the agreement. The self-contained premises were exclusively occupied, were not shared or supplemental, and were Mr Langridge’s sole home. The licence therefore fell within section 79(3) and operated as a secure tenancy despite the contrary intention.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): in [2008] EWCA Civ 264, allowed the appeal and held that the licence created statutory secure-tenancy protection.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Calvert-Smith J dismissed Mr Langridge’s appeal and upheld the county court’s possession decision.
• County court: HHJ O’Rorke held that 30 Willoughby Court was not let as a separate dwelling and made a possession order.