Velma Lyrae, R (on the application of) v Somerset Council

A purported further homelessness application must be assessed in two stages. First, the authority must decide whether it is an application at all by comparing it with the earlier application. A later application must generally be accepted where it contains a previously unasserted fact, or significant fresh evidence supporting a previously asserted fact, unless the new material is trivial or fanciful.

At that threshold stage the authority must not investigate the accuracy or merits of the new material. Those questions arise only after acceptance of the application, when the authority makes inquiries under Housing Act 1996, section 184. Evidence is new if it is new to the authority, even if it was previously available to the applicant. Repetition may be rejected as abusive only in rare cases involving improper conduct.

The claimant had previously been found homeless and eligible for assistance but not in priority need. She later submitted a further request for assistance, supported by reports from Dr Serra and Dr Downing concerning electrohypersensitivity and its effects.

Somerset Council refused to treat the correspondence as a fresh application. It concluded that the material disclosed no new relevant facts, or that any new facts were trivial. The claimant sought judicial review, contending that the council had applied the wrong legal test and had assessed the merits of the medical material prematurely.

The central issue was whether, applying the governing approach to repeat homelessness applications, the further material required the council to treat the correspondence as a fresh application.

1. Claim allowed and decision quashed. The council’s decision that the November 2023 correspondence was not a fresh application was unlawful.
2. The applicable approach, derived principally from Ivory, requires comparison of the earlier and later applications. The earlier application includes all matters relied on before its final determination. A later application must be accepted where it contains a new factual assertion which is neither trivial nor fanciful, or significant fresh evidence supporting a previously asserted fact. Rejection on the ground of repetition is an exceptional course.
3. The threshold is deliberately low. “Significant” fresh evidence is contrasted with material that is trivial or fanciful. Evidence need not advance a matter capable of determining the eventual vulnerability decision. It is new if it is new to the local housing authority, not merely if it was unavailable to the applicant.
4. The authority must not investigate the accuracy, weight or merits of the material at stage one. Those matters belong to stage two, after acceptance of the application, when the inquiries required by section 184 of the Housing Act 1996 are undertaken.
5. The council mischaracterised the earlier decision, misread Dr Downing’s report and assessed the substance of the medical evidence prematurely. Dr Downing’s report was significant fresh evidence supporting the previously asserted condition and its possible relevance to vulnerability. Dr Serra’s report was also material for consideration at the investigative stage.
6. A failure to submit available material previously will ordinarily reflect ignorance or inadvertence. Deliberately withholding evidence may constitute abuse, but such cases are likely to be very rare.
7. Relief was not precluded by section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. It was not highly likely that the outcome would have been substantially the same had the council applied the correct approach.
8. The council must reconsider whether the November 2023 request was a fresh application. Quashing that decision does not determine whether the claimant is vulnerable or in priority need.