Lemari Minott v Cambridge City Council

A housing authority must keep separate the question whether a purported subsequent homelessness application is a valid fresh application and the question whether it will succeed on its merits. It may reject the application only where it is based on precisely the same facts as the earlier application, disregarding facts that are plainly not new, fanciful or trivial.

Where a new, non-trivial fact is asserted, the authority must accept the application and make the statutory inquiries under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. It cannot investigate the truth, legal effect or likely merits of that fact at the threshold stage.

The appellant had made a homelessness application to Cambridge City Council. The council referred his case to Sandwell on the ground that he lacked a local connection with Cambridge. A review upheld that decision.

After he had remained resident in Cambridge for six months, the appellant made a further homelessness application. He relied on the six-month period as a new fact. The council declined to accept the application, treating his continued residence after the termination of his temporary licence as incapable of establishing a local connection.

The High Court dismissed his judicial-review claim: [2021] EWHC 211 (Admin). The central issue on appeal was whether the council had wrongly decided the merits of the asserted fact when determining whether the later application was a fresh application.

1. Appeal allowed. The council should have accepted the appellant's further homelessness application and determined it under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996.

2. The court applied R v Harrow LBC ex p Fahia and Rikha Begum v Tower Hamlets LBC. A purported subsequent application is no application only if it rests on exactly the same facts as the earlier application. An authority may disregard an allegation which, without further investigation, is known not to be new or is plainly fanciful or trivial. It may not impose a requirement of a material change of circumstances or make non-statutory inquiries into the accuracy or likely effect of the new fact.

3. The inquiry has two stages. At stage 1, the authority decides whether the application identifies a new, non-trivial fact. At stage 2, if it does, the authority makes the inquiries required by section 184 and decides its merits. A referral under section 198 may identify the authority responsible for those inquiries, but it does not justify treating a valid application as no application.

4. The appellant's asserted six months' residence was a new fact. It was neither fanciful nor trivial because the earlier review had rejected his local-connection case solely because he had not completed that period. The six-month period was a recognised working definition in the guidance, although it did not itself establish a local connection. Whether his continued occupation was normal residence, and whether it established a local connection, were stage-2 questions. The court did not decide them. It observed that unlawful occupation does not necessarily preclude normal residence for section 199(1)(a).

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Allowed the appeal and held that the council had to accept the fresh application: [2022] EWCA Civ 159.
• High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Administrative and Planning Court Dismissed the claimant's judicial-review claim. That decision was reversed: [2021] EWHC 211 (Admin).