Royal Borough of Kensington And Chelsea, R (On the Application Of) v London Borough Of Ealing

Under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996, a fresh housing application does not require the applicant to prove a material change of circumstances. The housing authority must undertake the statutory inquiries unless the application is based on exactly the same facts as an application finally determined previously. Where one authority accepts the main housing duty and refers the case on a local connection basis, and the notified authority accepts that the referral conditions are met, the notified authority becomes subject to the main duty. A previous cessation or discharge of duty does not prevent a new duty arising after a fresh application involving a new incidence of homelessness. The notified authority is not placed in a better position merely because the fresh application was made to another authority.

The claimant local authority accepted a homeless applicant’s fresh application under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 and referred the case to Ealing on local connection grounds. Ealing accepted that the referral conditions were satisfied but declined to undertake the main housing duty, relying on its earlier cessation of duty after the applicant had refused suitable accommodation.

The claimant challenged that decision by judicial review. The central issue was whether the earlier discharge of duty prevented a new duty arising under section 193(9), particularly where the fresh application was made to a different authority and the applicant had subsequently been evicted.

1. Claim allowed. Ealing was subject to the main housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996. The decision refusing to undertake that duty was unlawful.
2. The statutory scheme created by the Housing Act 1996 leaves no room for an additional judicial requirement that an applicant establish a material change of circumstances. Under section 193(9), a person whose duty has ceased may make a fresh application. The authority must undertake the statutory inquiries unless there has been no relevant change in circumstances at all, in which case there is no new application to consider.
3. The reasoning in R v Hammersmith & Fulham LBC, ex p. O’Brian and R v City of Westminster ex p. Chambers, which required a new incidence of homelessness or material change of circumstances, did not assist Ealing. It was based on the earlier statutory scheme and was inconsistent with the later legislation and R v LB of Harrow ex p. Fahia.
4. Rikha Begum v LB of Tower Hamlets confirmed that section 193(9) imposed no implied material-change requirement. The present case involved a relevant change in circumstances because the applicant had been evicted. Facing possession proceedings was materially different from having actually become homeless.
5. Once Kensington and Chelsea accepted the main duty and referred the case under section 200, and Ealing accepted that the referral conditions were met, Ealing became subject to the section 193 duty. The referral did not place Ealing in a worse position. It could have been protected if the referring authority had acted perversely in the Wednesbury sense or under a mistake of fact, but Ealing did not rely on either ground.
6. A quashing order and declaration were to be made. Ealing was ordered to pay Kensington and Chelsea’s costs on the standard basis, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.