Hill v Clacton Family Trust Ltd.

In deciding whether a claimant was affected by a recognised mental illness, an employment tribunal should focus on whether the condition existed at the material time. Evidence about whether the claimant saw or heard the traumatic event, and the precise cause of the condition, should not replace proper consideration of psychiatric evidence. A tribunal should also address materially relevant findings made by another tribunal, even where different statutory definitions apply. An apparent confusion between the existence of the disorder and its causation, coupled with inconsistent tribunal findings, may disclose an arguable error of law sufficient to justify permission to appeal. The Court of Appeal granted permission but did not determine the merits.

Caroline Hill alleged that she had developed post-traumatic stress disorder after witnessing or hearing a fatal motorcycle stunt accident in August 2000. She was summarily dismissed on 20 February 2001. The Employment Tribunal dismissed her application under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, although it found that she had been unfairly dismissed. It concluded that she was not suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder at the date of dismissal.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed her appeal. A tribunal concerned with disability benefits had, however, accepted that she was suffering from the disorder and had been suffering for at least six months. The central question was whether the Employment Tribunal's treatment of the medical and conflicting tribunal evidence disclosed an arguable error of law.

Application allowed. Lord Justice Ward granted permission to appeal from the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The merits of the disability discrimination claim were not determined.

1. Arguable error of law. An appeal from the Employment Tribunal through the Employment Appeal Tribunal must be based on an error of law rather than a mere challenge to fact-finding. The Employment Tribunal had correctly recognised that post-traumatic stress disorder could fall within the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and had identified the relevant date. Nevertheless, its reasoning raised sufficient concern to warrant consideration by a full court.
2. Condition and causation. The apparent true question was whether the claimant was suffering from the disorder at the date of dismissal. The Tribunal's focus on whether she had actually witnessed the accident, and its assessment of her reliability on that issue, arguably confused the existence of the disorder with the reason for it. Whether she saw or heard the event might not materially determine the aetiology of her condition, which was a matter requiring psychiatric evidence.
3. Conflicting tribunal findings. The Employment Tribunal had apparently failed adequately to weigh the fact that another tribunal had awarded disability benefits on the basis that the claimant was suffering from the same disorder and had been suffering for at least six months. Its explanation that the statutory definition was exclusive and that the other legislation presumably required different criteria was arguably insufficient to justify disregarding those findings.
4. Order. The matter was directed to be heard by a court of three, in half a day, with one member having Employment Appeal Tribunal experience. The court office was encouraged to seek pro bono assistance.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2005] EWCA Civ 5, permission to appeal was granted and the application was allowed.
2. Employment Appeal Tribunal: Dismissed the appeal from the Employment Tribunal.
3. Employment Tribunal: Dismissed the application under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, while finding that the claimant had been unfairly dismissed.