Chauhan v Chauhan

Permission to appeal against case-management directions is exceptional. An appellate court will rarely interfere with directions made to prepare a family hearing, particularly where the judge can secure a fair hearing by testing disputed evidence at the substantive hearing. A second appeal requires an important point of practice or procedure, or some other good reason. The applicant must show a real prospect of success and, for a second appeal, satisfy the additional high threshold. Allegations of bias or procedural unfairness require evidence. The court may refuse permission where the challenged order never took effect or no longer exists.

The parties were involved in long-running custody and financial proceedings following the breakdown of their marriage. Judge Ticehurst directed CAFCASS to prepare a welfare report and refused the appellant’s request to tape-record interviews. Judge Meston later refused permission to appeal orders concerning maintenance, attachment of earnings, variation applications and transfer to the High Court.

The appellant sought permission for appeals to the Court of Appeal, alleging bias, procedural irregularity, discrimination and breaches of Convention rights. The central issues were whether either proposed appeal had a real prospect of success and whether the second appeal raised an important point of practice or procedure or some other good reason.

1. Applications refused. The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal both orders.
2. The court will rarely interfere with directions made in preparation for a substantive family hearing. Even assuming jurisdiction to order tape-recording and disclosure of CAFCASS interviews, the matter lay within the judge’s discretion. That discretion could not seriously be challenged, and the proposed appeal had no real prospect of success.
3. The proposed appeals from the district judges’ orders were second appeals. The applicant had to show an important point of practice or procedure, or some other good reason. The material disclosed neither a plainly wrong decision nor a serious procedural irregularity.
4. There was no evidence supporting the allegation that Judge Meston was biased. The appellant’s strong disagreement with the courts, extreme language and extensive legal submissions did not establish an arguable appeal.
5. The challenge to the June order was pointless because it had never taken effect and no longer existed. The November order was made consistently with the overriding objective under Rule 2.5(1)(b) of the Family Proceedings Rules. A transcript was supplied at public expense.

• Southampton County Court: District judges made orders concerning maintenance, attachment of earnings, variation of periodical payments and transfer of proceedings.
• Southampton County Court: Judge Meston refused permission to appeal those orders.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal both challenged orders was refused: [2005] EWCA Civ 640.