Jones & Ors v Ceredigion County Council

Where a leapfrog certificate concerns separate issues and the House of Lords grants leave on only some of them, section 13(2)(a) of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 excludes a Court of Appeal appeal only on the issue for which leave was granted. A refusal of leave on another issue does not remove the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction. The absence of separate declarations does not make independently decisive issues indivisible. Case-management powers can prevent concurrent or pointless appeals. A contingent permission order should be construed in its context; here it gave permission to appeal on both certified issues.

The respondents obtained judicial review of the local education authority’s refusal to fund transport to their chosen Welsh-medium school. Collins J quashed the refusal in [2004] EWHC 1376 (Admin), having decided the linkage issue and the meaning of suitable arrangements under the Education Act 1996 in their favour.

He granted a leapfrog certificate. The House of Lords Appeal Committee refused permission on the linkage issue but granted it on a second issue subject to a costs condition. The authority withdrew that appeal and sought to pursue the linkage issue in the Court of Appeal. The central question was whether section 13(2)(a) of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 deprived the Court of Appeal of jurisdiction following that partial grant of leave.

Disposition

1. By a majority, the court allowed the authority’s appeal on the preliminary issues. Maurice Kay LJ and Sir Christopher Staughton held that the court had jurisdiction and that Collins J had granted contingent permission to appeal on the linkage issue. The merits of that issue were not decided and were to be heard. Waller LJ dissented.

2. Section 13(2)(a) of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 had to accommodate a partial grant of leapfrog permission. Its purpose was to prevent Court of Appeal litigation of a matter for which leave to appeal directly to the House of Lords had been granted. It did not expressly extinguish an otherwise available appeal on a separate and independently decisive issue for which leave had been refused.

3. Per Maurice Kay LJ, “decision of the judge to which the certificate relates” was therefore confined to the decision, or part of a decision, for which the House of Lords had granted leave. The possibility of concurrent proceedings did not require a contrary construction. The Court of Appeal could stay or control an appeal that was premature or rendered pointless by the House of Lords proceedings.

4. The majority did not regard the absence of formal declarations as decisive. Collins J had plainly determined two issues, each essential to the quashing order. Per Sir Christopher Staughton, a technical distinction between declarations and stated conclusions should not defeat the appeal.

5. Construed with the order and surrounding circumstances, Collins J’s contingent permission to appeal applied to both issues. As the House of Lords had refused leave on the linkage issue, the authority could pursue that issue in the Court of Appeal.

• House of Lords Appeal Committee — On the leapfrog application, permission was refused on the linkage issue and granted on a second issue subject to a costs condition. The authority withdrew the appeal on that second issue.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — [2005] EWCA Civ 986: by majority, held that jurisdiction remained to hear the issue for which the House of Lords had refused leave, and that contingent permission to appeal had been granted.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court — Collins J, [2004] EWHC 1376 (Admin): quashed the authority’s refusal to provide transport.