Jeshani, R v

Dangerous driving under Road Traffic Act 1988, section 2 A requires proof of two separate and demanding elements. The driving must fall far below the standard expected of a competent and careful driver. It must also have been obvious to such a driver that driving in that way would be dangerous.

A direction which reduces the first element to a failure to exercise reasonable care, or which obscures the second element as an additional requirement, risks confusing careless and dangerous driving. Where that confusion remains when the jury seeks clarification, a conviction for causing death by dangerous driving is unsafe. A judge should, where practicable, give clear written clarification on a critical legal issue that troubles the jury.

The appellant, a lorry driver, was convicted at Snaresbrook Crown Court of causing death by dangerous driving after his lorry struck and killed a woman as he drove away from a junction. His account was that she had entered his cab uninvited, refused to leave when asked, and got out hurriedly with the passenger door open.

He received an absolute discharge, six penalty points and a costs order. He appealed against conviction on the ground that the judge had failed clearly to distinguish dangerous driving from careless driving. The central issue was whether the jury directions correctly stated the statutory requirements of dangerous driving and adequately answered the jury's request for clarification.

1. Appeal allowed. The court quashed the conviction for causing death by dangerous driving and substituted a conviction for careless driving.

2. Section 2 A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 contains two distinct and complementary requirements. The prosecution must establish both that the driving fell far below the standard expected of a competent and careful driver and that it would have been obvious to such a driver that driving in that way would be dangerous. Each requirement sets a high threshold.

3. The judge's later direction misstated the first requirement by treating it substantially as a failure to exercise the care and attention of a reasonably competent and prudent driver. That was the standard of careless driving, not the statutory threshold for dangerous driving. His formulation also risked presenting obvious danger as an explanation of the first requirement rather than an additional requirement.

4. Although an earlier and later passage included a correct formulation, the jury subsequently asked for written clarification of the distinction between careless and dangerous driving. The judge refused written clarification and repeated the inaccurate direction without repeating the corrective passage. The final answer therefore left the jury confused on the critical issue. The conviction was unsafe.

5. The court observed that, when a jury seeks help on a critical legal question, a judge should do what is reasonably possible to provide clear written clarification. The court left the absolute discharge undisturbed, reduced the licence endorsement from six to three penalty points, and made no further order.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction for causing death by dangerous driving, and substituted a conviction for careless driving: [2005] EWCA Crim 146.

• Crown Court at Snaresbrook: On 19 April 2004, convicted the appellant of causing death by dangerous driving. On 14 May 2004, imposed an absolute discharge, six penalty points and a costs order.