R v Joyce

Under Criminal Justice Act 2003 section 125, the threshold for withdrawing a hearsay case from the jury is no higher than the ordinary no-case standard. The provision nevertheless supplies an additional statutory safeguard. The judge must direct an acquittal if hearsay evidence, considered with its importance to the prosecution case and all the circumstances, is so unconvincing that a conviction would be unsafe.

A previous inconsistent statement properly admitted under section 119 may prove its contents. A later retraction does not automatically make an earlier identification too weak for a jury. The jury should assess both accounts and the reasons for the change. Identification directions and hearsay directions must be tailored to the evidence, with particular care where the hearsay is multiple hearsay.

At Liverpool Crown Court, Richard and James Joyce were convicted of possessing a firearm with intent to cause fear of violence after a shooting at a house. Richard Joyce received seven years’ imprisonment and James Joyce received eight years’ imprisonment.

The prosecution relied principally on statements made on the day of the incident by three eyewitnesses. Each identified one or both applicants, but each later retracted that account in oral evidence. The trial judge admitted the earlier statements under section 119 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

The applicants sought leave to appeal against conviction and sentence. They contended that the judge should have directed acquittals under section 125, that the identification and hearsay directions were defective, and that the sentences were manifestly excessive.

1. The court granted an eight-day extension of time but refused leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
2. Section 119 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 made the witnesses’ previous inconsistent statements admissible as evidence of their contents once its conditions were met. The later retractions did not, of themselves, render the earlier identifications weak. It was for the jury to assess the competing accounts and the reasons for the witnesses’ changed evidence.
3. Section 125 was not to impose a higher threshold than R v Galbraith 73 Cr App R(S) 124. It was an additional safety valve requiring an acquittal where the hearsay evidence was so unconvincing, having regard to its importance, that conviction would be unsafe. The trial judge had considered the surrounding circumstances and was better placed than the appellate court to assess the witnesses. The original identifications were made in broad daylight by witnesses who knew the applicants and had unobstructed views. There was therefore no basis for a directed acquittal.
4. The summing-up gave an adequate direction in accordance with R v Turnbull 63 Cr App R(S) 132. Although an express reference to the possibility of mistaken recognition would have been preferable, the direction read as a whole gave sufficient caution and correctly explained the burden and standard of proof. The judge also fairly set out the jury’s options concerning the original statements and the oral retractions.
5. The court declined to give wider general guidance on hearsay summings-up. Such directions must be tailored to the case. Where the hearsay is multiple hearsay, a careful direction about that fact and the weight to be given to it will be essential. The present statements were each the maker’s own account. The sentences reflected exceptionally grave firearm conduct and were not manifestly excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — granted an extension of time but refused leave to appeal against conviction and sentence: [2005] EWCA Crim 1785.
• Liverpool Crown Court — convicted both applicants on 27 April 2005 of possessing a firearm with intent to cause fear of violence; sentenced Richard Joyce to seven years’ imprisonment and James Joyce to eight years’ imprisonment.