Stalford & Anor v R.

A jury is not necessarily discharged merely because the judge uses words of discharge. A prompt correction, while the jury remains assembled and before its integrity is compromised, may mean that no effective discharge occurred. Alternatively, an effective discharge may be set aside only in rare circumstances and only where the jury and its deliberations have remained wholly uncompromised.

A defect in a summing-up or direction does not render convictions unsafe unless, assessed in the context of the evidence and directions as a whole, there is a real possibility that it affected the verdict. A direction excluding a withdrawn complaint as evidence of the charged conduct may properly preserve its limited relevance to the timing and effect of the complaint on other witnesses.

The appellants, husband and wife, were convicted at Ipswich Crown Court before His Honour Judge Thompson of sexual offences against their daughters. The joint counts alleged ritual sexual abuse. David Stalford received nine years’ imprisonment. Bette Stalford received three years’ imprisonment.

After returning some verdicts, the jury said that it could not reach verdicts on the joint counts. The judge stated that he would discharge it, but immediately reconsidered following counsel’s intervention while the jury remained in the box. The jury then retired again and returned unanimous guilty verdicts on the outstanding counts.

Both appellants appealed against conviction. They challenged the validity of those verdicts and raised alleged defects in the summing-up and directions. David Stalford also sought leave, out of time, to appeal against sentence.

1. The appeals against conviction were dismissed. The judge’s initial words of discharge did not amount to an effective discharge. He immediately reversed course while the jury was still assembled in the jury box, following a proper intervention by counsel, and invited further deliberation.
2. In any event, the court held that a judge has a discretion, exercisable only in rare circumstances, to set aside an effective discharge. The discretion depends upon the integrity of the jury and its deliberations having remained uncompromised. The court applied the principle recognised in R v Follen ([1994] Crim LR 225) and R v Aylott ([1996] 2 C.A.R. 169). The circumstances differed materially from the compromised further deliberations considered in R v ZA. The subsequent verdicts were therefore sustainable.
3. The alleged omissions from the summing-up did not make the convictions unsafe. Although the judge should have given the further direction he had indicated concerning Bette Stalford’s failure to give evidence, the evidence and directions as a whole left no real possibility that its absence affected the jury’s assessment of David Stalford’s credibility or the verdicts. Nor did the absence of a direction about Bette Stalford’s interview answers affect safety, because those answers did not incriminate him.
4. The direction on S’s withdrawn allegations was adequate when read with the later qualification. The jury could use the fact, timing and possible effect of S’s complaint upon her sisters, but not treat it as evidence supporting the charged allegations. David Stalford’s extension of time was granted, but leave to appeal against his nine-year sentence was refused because it was not arguably manifestly excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The court dismissed both appeals against conviction and refused David Stalford leave to appeal against sentence, while granting an extension of time ([2005] EWCA Crim 1988).
• Ipswich Crown Court: Before His Honour Judge Thompson and a jury, both appellants were convicted of sexual offences against their daughters. David Stalford was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment and Bette Stalford to three years’ imprisonment.