Iaquaniello, R. v

A count alleging an act or series of acts intended to pervert the course of public justice is not duplicitous merely because it particularises several alleged acts. The prosecution need not prove that each act was intended to pervert a specified form of public justice, such as criminal rather than civil justice. It is sufficient to prove that the act had a tendency to pervert, and was intended to pervert, the course of public justice.

A late amendment to an indictment requires careful scrutiny of genuine prejudice to the defence. Alternative substantive counts may remain available if the principal count results in an acquittal; there is no general rule requiring the prosecution to elect between them in such circumstances.

The appellant, a serving police officer, was convicted at Croydon Crown Court of doing acts intended to pervert the course of public justice. The prosecution alleged that, after a series of earlier complaints which it accepted might have been genuine, she fabricated later reports of attacks, burglaries and damage in order to prompt police investigations or support a possible civil claim.

Shortly before trial, the prosecution obtained leave to add the perverting-the-course-of-justice count. The original counts, including dangerous driving, deception and criminal damage, were left as alternatives. The appellant appealed against conviction, challenging the amendment, alleged duplicity, the alleged lack of clarity about the intended form of public justice, the absence of an election between counts, and aspects of the trial. She also appealed a sentence of two years and six months’ imprisonment.

1. The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The trial judge was entitled to permit the late amendment. Although the timing was regrettable, the judge carefully examined each allegation and was entitled to find no genuine prejudice amounting to injustice.

2. The new count was not duplicitous. Duplicity concerned the form of the count, rather than the evidence supporting it. An offence of perverting the course of public justice may be committed by one act or by a series of acts. It was therefore permissible to particularise ten acts within one count without making each a separate count.

3. The prosecution had to prove, in respect of an act relied upon, that it tended and was intended to pervert the course of public justice. It did not have to identify whether the appellant intended to affect criminal or civil justice, nor prove which of several possible motives predominated. The distinction between an intention to pervert public justice and the motive for acting removed the alleged uncertainty.

4. The prosecution was not required to elect between the principal count and the alternative substantive counts. The arrangement caused no injustice, particularly as the substantive counts would have been pursued only if the appellant had been acquitted on count 1.

5. The court accepted that the prosecutor’s invitation to the jury to infer handwriting characteristics without expert evidence, and the majority direction given only on count 1, were errors. Neither error, separately or cumulatively with the other grounds, rendered the conviction unsafe. The direction under Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, section 34, was clear and created no real risk of confusion.

6. The appeal against sentence was allowed. A custodial sentence was inevitable, but two years and six months was manifestly excessive. The court substituted 12 months’ imprisonment, taking account of the absence of an identified victim who had lost liberty, the appellant’s health and previous good character, the loss of her career, exceptional hardship in custody, and family circumstances.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — By [2005] EWCA Crim 2029, dismissed the appeal against conviction but allowed the appeal against sentence, substituting 12 months’ imprisonment.

• Crown Court at Croydon — On 10 December 2004, convicted the appellant by a majority of 10 to 2 of acts intended to pervert the course of public justice and later sentenced her to two years and six months’ imprisonment.