Humphris, R. v

Documentary details of the circumstances of a defendant’s previous convictions are admissible only if the statutory hearsay conditions are met. The business-document route in section 117 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires the person supplying the information to have, or reasonably be supposed to have, personal knowledge of the matters recorded. A police record of alleged methods used in earlier offences did not meet that requirement where its contents depended on an earlier complainant and the necessary evidential foundation was absent.

Wrongly admitting such details does not automatically make a conviction unsafe. The appellate court must assess the error in the context of the whole trial, including properly admissible evidence of the fact and nature of the previous convictions, the judge’s directions, and the strength of the independent evidence.

The appellant was convicted at Preston Crown Court of sexual assault, wounding with intent, and committing an offence with intent to commit a relevant sexual offence. He received a mandatory life sentence for the wounding count, with concurrent sentences on the other counts.

The prosecution relied on his earlier convictions as bad-character evidence. It adduced police computer records which stated not only the convictions but also alleged methods used in committing them. The appellant contended that the records were inadmissible hearsay because the requirements of section 117 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 had not been met.

The central issue was whether the admission of those details rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The trial judge was wrong to admit the police-record entries describing the alleged methods used in the appellant’s previous offences. The error did not, however, make the convictions unsafe.

2. Section 117 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 imposed conditions which had to be met before the documentary hearsay could be admitted. Although the fact of the earlier convictions could be proved under sections 73 and 74 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and could potentially be relevant bad-character evidence under section 101(1)(d) of the 2003 Act, that did not establish the admissibility of the additional descriptions.

3. The entries concerning the methods used did not satisfy section 117(2)(b). Their substance depended on information from the complainants in the earlier cases, but the necessary evidential foundation had not been laid to show that the person supplying the recorded information had the requisite personal knowledge. The understandable wish to avoid burdening former complainants could not displace the statutory requirements.

4. The court nevertheless held that the trial remained safe. The jury was properly entitled to know the fact and nature of the earlier convictions. The judge’s directions on their relevance were unobjectionable, the appellant gave his own account of the earlier offences, and the independent evidence of the charged conduct was overwhelming.

5. The court also endorsed the case-management guidance in R v Hanson and Others [2005] EWCA Crim 824. If the prosecution requires the circumstances of earlier convictions, its application should identify both those circumstances and the proposed proof. The circumstances should ordinarily be agreed where possible; otherwise the prosecution should obtain admissible first-hand evidence, normally from the earlier complainant in a sexual case, only where necessary.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — dismissed the appeal against conviction: [2005] EWCA Crim 2030.
• Crown Court at Preston — on 12 April 2005, convicted the appellant of sexual assault, wounding with intent, and committing an offence with intent to commit a relevant sexual offence; a mandatory life sentence was imposed for the wounding count.