Green, R v

A conviction is not quashed merely because related verdicts appear logically inconsistent. The decisive question is whether, having regard to the evidence, the presentation of the case and all the verdicts, no properly directed reasonable jury could have returned the conviction. A secondary party may in principle be convicted of murder where the principal is convicted of manslaughter, since liability depends on each person’s intent. However, where the evidence and the prosecution case make the disparate findings irrational, the murder conviction is unsafe under the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.

The appellant and Roy Junior Scott were tried at the Central Criminal Court for the killing of Jason Gibson. The appellant was convicted of murder and robbery. Scott was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter.

The prosecution alleged a joint enterprise and maintained that Scott was most likely to have used the knife. Each defendant blamed the other. The appellant appealed his murder conviction, contending that, in light of Scott’s verdict, it was unsafe. The central issue was whether the differing verdicts could rationally stand in light of the evidence and the way the Crown had put its case.

1. The appeal was allowed in part. The court applied the established approach to allegedly inconsistent verdicts. A conviction may be quashed where no reasonable jury, properly applying its mind to the facts, could have returned it. Formal logical inconsistency is usually important, but a verdict may still be unsafe where the circumstances make it irrational.

2. The Crown’s proposed reconciliations meant that the verdicts were not logically inconsistent in the abstract. In particular, a secondary party can in principle be guilty of murder although the principal is convicted of manslaughter, because their respective intentions may differ.

3. That theoretical possibility did not resolve this case. The evidence and the Crown’s presentation strongly pointed to Scott as the knife wielder. In that setting, the court could not understand how a rational jury could find that the appellant had the intent required for murder while Scott did not. The jury’s questions showed that it had struggled with joint enterprise and intent. The omission of Scott from the robbery count may also have contributed to the difficulty.

4. The appellant’s murder conviction was therefore unsafe. It was set aside and replaced by a conviction for manslaughter, since the jury were entitled to find that both defendants participated in the killing with at least the intent required for manslaughter. An eight-year sentence was imposed for manslaughter. The robbery conviction and its concurrent sentence were unaffected.

The court also observed that, in a complex trial with interrupted deliberations, a written aide-memoire and a chronological presentation of the evidence can assist the jury.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). In [2005] EWCA Crim 2513, the court allowed the appeal against the murder conviction, substituted a conviction for manslaughter, and imposed eight years’ imprisonment for that count.
• Central Criminal Court. Before HHJ Moss QC, the appellant was convicted of murder and robbery. His co-accused was acquitted of murder and convicted of manslaughter.