Renda, R v

The bad-character provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 require fact-specific decisions by the trial judge. An appellate court will rarely interfere with such evaluative rulings and will quash a conviction only if any error affects its safety.

A defendant who has created a false impression does not normally withdraw it by making concessions only when cross-examined. Evidence of a prior act may correct that impression if it amounts to reprehensible behaviour, even though it did not result in a conviction. Evidence of a non-defendant’s bad character must meet the statutory threshold of explanatory importance or substantial probative value in the case as a whole.

Six appeals concerning the bad-character regime in Part II, Chapter 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 were heard together. They arose from convictions in the Crown Courts at Inner London, Sheffield, Burnley, Cardiff and Isleworth.

Renda concerned a defendant’s allegedly false impression of good character. Ball concerned an imputation made during a police interview under caution. Akram, Osbourne, and Ajaz and Abdul Razaq concerned the admissibility and use of complainants’ or a defence witness’s bad character. The Razaq appeals also raised the adequacy of directions on defending another person.

The central issues were whether the trial judges had correctly applied the statutory gateways and whether any alleged error rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. All six appeals were dismissed. The court stressed that rulings on bad character and other fact-sensitive evidential issues commonly involve a trial judge’s evaluative judgment. The Court of Appeal should be slow to interfere. Even an erroneous ruling or direction does not require a conviction to be quashed unless it affected the conviction’s safety.

2. Renda. Under sections 101(1)(f) and 105 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, whether a defendant has created a false impression, and whether corrective evidence is available, is fact-specific. Renda had sought to present himself as a person of positive good character. His concessions in cross-examination did not normally amount to withdrawal or disassociation under section 105(3), because they were extracted rather than voluntarily made. The earlier violent act was capable of being reprehensible behaviour despite the finding that he was unfit to plead and had not been convicted. The evidence was therefore properly admitted to correct the false impression. Section 107 did not permit a renewed challenge to the initial admissibility ruling: it applies where admitted bad-character evidence later proves false or misleading in the statutory sense.

3. Ball. The appellant’s disparaging interview comments about the complainant were evidence given by him when questioned under caution within section 106(1)(c). They were relevant to the prosecution case and amounted to an attack on the complainant’s character. The judge was entitled to permit cross-examination about the appellant’s bad character under section 101(1)(g), having considered fairness.

4. Akram and Osbourne. The excluded allegation that the dangerous-driving complainant had later been charged with kidnap was unproved and could not explain a motive for an earlier attack. It lacked the substantial probative value required by section 100. In Osbourne, general drug misuse at the licensed premises did not materially support the allegation that the complainant had invented a robbery. By contrast, the defence witness’s recent conviction for serious violence was admissible because it had substantial probative value on the vital issue whether the robbery allegation was fabricated. The judge’s sparse reasons were inadequate for section 110(1), but the ruling was correct and the deficiency did not affect safety.

5. Razaq and Razaq. Any limitation on cross-examination about the complainant’s convictions was cured when the material convictions for violence were put before the jury. The directions should have more expressly connected those convictions with the issue whether the complainant was aggressor or victim, but the convictions remained safe. The common law permits reasonable force to protect another person. Unlike Duffy [1967] 1 QB 63, that defence had not been withdrawn: the jury received a full direction which was expressly applied to the appellants’ case that they intervened to protect Shabaz.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). Dismissed the appeals of Renda, Ball, Akram, Osbourne, Ajaz Razaq and Abdul Razaq against conviction; it also dismissed Akram’s appeal against sentence.

• Crown Court at Inner London. Renda was convicted of attempted robbery.

• Crown Court at Sheffield. Ball was convicted of two counts of rape.

• Crown Court at Burnley. Akram was convicted of dangerous driving and sentenced to detention in a Young Offender Institution with driving disqualification.

• Crown Court at Cardiff. Osbourne was convicted of robbery.

• Crown Court at Isleworth. Ajaz Razaq and Abdul Razaq were convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and affray.