Bailey, R. v

Evidence of domestic violence may be admissible under Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 101(1)(d), where it is capable of proving a propensity to excessive family violence and rebutting an assertion that violence towards children was reasonable chastisement. A historical bind over neither automatically removes nor automatically preserves an accused's entitlement to a good-character direction. The judge must assess all relevant circumstances.

A direction on cross-admissibility must require the jury to be sure that complainants' accounts are truly independent before using one account to support another. A conviction may nevertheless rest on a complainant's evidence alone if the jury is sure it is reliable. Historic offending may justify substantial consecutive sentences, subject to totality and personal mitigation.

The appellant was convicted at Woolwich Crown Court of four counts of child cruelty and four counts of indecent assault committed against four of his children between 1971 and 1988. He received a total sentence of eight years' imprisonment.

He appealed against conviction, challenging the admission of evidence that he had assaulted his former wife, the absence of a good-character direction, and the judge's directions on cross-admissibility between the complainants. He also renewed his application for leave to appeal against sentence. The central issues were whether the convictions were unsafe because of the contested directions and rulings, and whether the sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

Appeal against conviction dismissed; renewed applications for leave to appeal on further conviction grounds and against sentence refused.

1. Bad character. The evidence that the appellant had used violence against his wife was properly admitted under section 101(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. It was capable of showing a propensity to excessive violence within the family, which went materially beyond the limited force he accepted as reasonable chastisement. It also assisted the jury in assessing his account of family discipline. The evidence had probative value, its admission was fair, and the jury direction adequately confined its use.
2. Good character. A bind over does not inevitably deprive an accused of a full good-character direction. Whether an accused should be treated as being of effective good character depends on all relevant circumstances, including the circumstances of the bind over. Here, however, the absence of a direction did not affect safety. If the jury were sure that the appellant had assaulted his wife, the properly admitted bad-character evidence meant that any good-character direction would have required substantial qualification. A separate propensity direction confined to the sexual allegations would have been unreal.
3. Cross-admissibility. The directions correctly required the jury to consider each count separately and to use one complainant's evidence in support of another only if sure that the accounts were truly independent. The judge was not required to use the words collusion or contamination. Her references to conscious or unconscious influence, motives to fabricate, and opportunities to collude adequately addressed the defence case. Independence was not a requirement of corroboration: the jury could convict on an individual account if sure it was truthful and accurate.
4. Sentence. The judge correctly applied the approach to historic offending indicated by R. v H [2011] EWCA Crim 2753. The prolonged cruelty, multiple victims, sexual offending and serious harm justified the individual and consecutive sentences. The eight-year total reflected totality and a substantial reduction for the appellant's age and infirmity. It was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). By [2017] EWCA Crim 35, dismissed the appeal against conviction and refused the renewed applications for leave to appeal.
• Woolwich Crown Court. Convicted the appellant of four child-cruelty counts and four indecent-assault counts, and imposed a total sentence of eight years' imprisonment.