Slocombe, R v

For notification purposes under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the equivalent sentence of imprisonment for a detention and training order is the period of detention and training, rather than the whole term of the order. The statutory distinction between detention and supervision must be maintained. A 12-month detention and training order therefore equates to six months’ imprisonment. For an offender under 18, the resulting notification period is three and a half years. A conviction based on notification obligations that had expired is unsafe.

The appellant had received a 12-month detention and training order in 2000 following conviction for an indecent assault. After a later custodial sentence for theft, he was released in November 2004 and did not notify the police of his release or changes of address.

He was charged with four offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. HHJ Griggs, sitting in the Crown Court at Exeter, rejected his argument that his notification period had expired. The appellant then pleaded guilty.

On appeal, the central issue was whether the equivalent term of imprisonment for a detention and training order under section 131(a) was the whole 12-month order or its six-month detention and training component.

1. The appeal was allowed. The guilty pleas followed a ruling which was wrong in law, and the convictions were unsafe.

2. The court identified an amendment made by paragraph 144 of Schedule 8 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. It had brought detention and training orders within section 4(1)(a) of the Sex Offenders Act 1997. The parties’ shared assumption to the contrary was therefore mistaken.

3. A detention and training order has two distinct components. Under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, the period of detention and training is half the term of the order, while supervision runs from release until the term ends. The offender is liable to serve a period of detention and training, not the whole sentence as detention.

4. Section 131(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 refers to the period of detention which the offender is liable to serve. That language could readily have referred to the order or its term had Parliament intended that result. The contrast with section 131(f)–(j), which refers to sentences of detention, confirmed that the distinction was deliberate.

5. The appellant’s 12-month order was therefore equivalent to six months’ imprisonment for section 82. As he was under 18, the seven-year notification period was halved to three and a half years from conviction. It had expired before the alleged failures to notify in November and December 2004.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). Allowed the appeal against conviction and held the convictions unsafe: [2005] EWCA Crim 2997.
• Crown Court at Exeter (HHJ Griggs). Rejected the appellant’s legal argument on 17 March 2005. The appellant pleaded guilty on 11 April 2005.