Heyward v Plymouth Hospital NHS Trust

Permission for additional expert evidence is not justified by a speculative possibility that an opponent may later call evidence requiring rebuttal. In a straightforward stress-at-work claim, where the central issues are factual and psychiatric experts can address the relevant clinical matters, limiting each party to one psychiatrist may be a proportionate case-management decision. Equality of arms depends on the evidence actually expected at trial. If an unforeseen need for specialist occupational evidence later arises, the affected party may apply for permission then. A comparatively modest individual claim should not be used to explore wider questions about the application of health-and-safety materials where those questions are not necessary to decide it.

The claimant alleged that his employer caused psychiatric injury through workplace stress. He relied on alleged mishandling after he reported suspected wrongdoing by colleagues, intimidating conduct by a former manager, and an excessive workload.

At a case-management conference, the deputy district judge permitted each side to rely on one consultant psychiatrist and refused permission for the claimant also to call an occupational psychologist. On appeal, HHJ Overend upheld that restriction. The claimant brought a second appeal, contending that occupational evidence was required on breach, causation, risk assessment and equality of arms.

The central issue was whether the restriction on expert evidence was a proportionate response to the issues reasonably arising in the action.

Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal upheld the orders limiting each party to one consultant psychiatrist.

1. The principal issues were factual: whether the claimant had been subjected to work overload and, if so, whether that caused his psychiatric injury. On the material then available, there was no indication that the Trust would contend that an established work overload was unforeseeable or incapable of prevention.
2. In the context of this case, the psychiatric experts were competent to express opinions about appropriate measures when returning a person known to have suffered anxiety or depression to work. An occupational specialist might be appropriate if a distinct organisational or risk-assessment issue arose, but the evidence did not presently demonstrate that need.
3. There was no present inequality of arms. Chesterfield v North Derbyshire Royal Hospital NHS Trust [2004] Lloyds Rep Med 90 concerned a high-value, complex claim in which the defendant’s professional factual evidence was known. Here, the suggested quasi-expert evidence from the Trust was only a remote possibility. If such evidence were later relied on, the claimant could seek further permission to call responsive expert evidence.
4. The claimant could not use this comparatively small and clear claim as a vehicle for wider exploration of the applicability of health-and-safety directives and regulations to stress-at-work liability. The earlier case-management decisions were sensible and proportionate.

The claimant was ordered to pay the Trust’s costs of £5,500 within 28 days.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The claimant’s second appeal was dismissed in [2005] EWCA Crim 939, upholding the restriction on expert evidence.
• Plymouth County Court (HHJ Overend): On 27 September 2004, the judge dismissed the claimant’s appeal from the deputy district judge’s case-management order.
• Deputy District Judge Lloyd Davis: On 15 March 2004, the judge permitted one consultant psychiatrist for each side and refused permission for an additional occupational psychologist.