HM Attorney-General v Ebert

A court may restrain a vexatious litigant from making further applications where repeated, meritless litigation threatens the proper administration of justice. The court need not revisit the merits of disputes already determined when deciding whether restraint is necessary. Restrictions may extend to abusive communications and to applications concerning matters which are already closed, provided the litigant’s essential access to the court is not extinguished. An order may be made without limit of time where the conduct shows little prospect of change, while remaining open to variation if circumstances generally alter. The court may also regulate future applications by subject matter and frequency.

The Attorney-General applied for continuation and extension of injunctions previously made against Gedaljahu Ebert after prolonged and repetitive litigation arising from the collapse of Europride Ltd, related bankruptcy proceedings and associated matters. Earlier orders under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 had restricted his ability to issue proceedings.

The application sought continuing restrictions on written applications, attendance at the Royal Courts of Justice, abusive communications, and any attempt to reopen the Europride and bankruptcy disputes. It also sought controls on future applications under section 42 and on vexatious requests under the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Freedom of Information Act 2000. The central issues were whether the restrictions were necessary and lawful, and how far they should extend.

1. Relief granted. The court continued the injunction made on 21 September 2001, restrained abusive or insulting communications with judges and court officers, and prohibited applications under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 concerning the Europride, assignment, bankruptcy and related matters. The new orders were made without limit of time.
2. When considering whether a vexatious litigant requires restraint, the Divisional Court is concerned with protecting the court’s processes and the proper administration of justice. It is not required to revisit the merits of disputes which the litigant has repeatedly and unsuccessfully litigated. The court applied the approach in Attorney-General v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 859.
3. The history showed persistent relitigation, hundreds of meritless applications, repeated attempts to challenge the same bankruptcy-related matters, disruption of court business and abusive correspondence. Those circumstances justified protection of judges, staff, other court users and scarce judicial resources.
4. The restriction on abusive communications was justified by the need to protect the court’s processes. The court relied on Mahajan v Waldman [2003] EWCA Civ 1899 as a precedent for such an order.
5. Neither the common law nor Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights prevented the court from regulating its own process. Access to a court may be controlled to prevent abuse, provided its very essence is not extinguished. The present restrictions were proportionate to the exceptional history.
6. Further controls were imposed on future applications: no section 42 application concerning a cause of action more than six years old, and applications only once in each half of a calendar year. Prohibited applications and correspondence, including vexatious data-protection or freedom-of-information requests, were to have no effect and required no action.
7. The defendant’s application for permission to appeal was refused because there was no real prospect of success. A transcript of the judgment was directed to be made available at public expense.