R & Ors, R (on the application of) v Leeds City Council (Education Leeds)

Under section 509 of the Education Act 1996, a local education authority must consider whether transport is necessary to facilitate school attendance, having regard to parental wishes concerning religious education. Parental preference is important but is not decisive. An authority may consider the suitability of nearer schools, cost, resource allocation and lawfully adopted policy. Its assessment of suitability is reviewable on ordinary Wednesbury grounds.

A refusal to fund transport does not, without more, engage rights to private and family life, freedom of religion, or education where the children remain able to attend their chosen schools. Article 14 is not engaged where the underlying Convention rights are not engaged.

Nine children resident in Leeds sought judicial review of Leeds City Council’s decisions refusing to provide free transport to schools in Manchester. Their parents wished them to receive Jewish education. The council relied on the distance, cost and availability of schools in Leeds, including a school offering Hebrew studies.

The claimants alleged Wednesbury unreasonableness, breaches of Articles 8, 9 and Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the Convention, discrimination under Article 14, and breaches of sections 17 and 18 of the Race Relations Act 1976. The central issue was whether the council had lawfully assessed the suitability of nearer schools and properly considered the statutory matters.

1. The application for judicial review was dismissed. The council was entitled to conclude that Leeds secondary schools offering the national curriculum were suitable alternatives and that free transport to Manchester was unnecessary. The decision was neither irrational nor Wednesbury unreasonable: [2005] EWHC 2495 (Admin), [29]-[31].

2. Section 509(1) of the Education Act 1996 imposes a duty to make transport arrangements considered necessary to facilitate attendance. Section 509(4) requires regard, among other matters, to the child’s age, the route, and parental wishes for religious education. The council had not unlawfully treated cost as overriding those matters. It had considered them as part of the suitability and resource assessment: [15], [22]-[30].

3. The assessment of a nearer school’s suitability is subject to Wednesbury review. Relevant considerations include parental preference, the inherent suitability of the preferred and alternative schools, financial considerations including unreasonable public expenditure, and lawful policy considerations. None is automatically decisive. The council’s decision letter demonstrated substantive consideration rather than a mere tick-box exercise: [17]-[18], [29]-[30].

4. There was no relevant comparison between the arrangements for Christian pupils attending nearby designated schools and the claimants’ request for transport over 45 miles to Manchester. The alleged distinction therefore did not establish unlawful discrimination or irrationality: [21], [28]-[30].

5. Articles 8 and 9 were not engaged or infringed. The transport decision did not interfere with private or family life, and the children were not prevented from attending Jewish schools or manifesting their religion. Article 2 of Protocol 1 was not engaged; alternatively, the decision fell within the United Kingdom’s reservation concerning efficient instruction and avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure. Article 14 was consequently not engaged: [31]-[47].

6. The Administrative Court had no jurisdiction over the Race Relations Act claims, which had to be brought in the County Court under sections 53 and 57 of the Race Relations Act 1976. In any event, section 17 did not apply because the complaint concerned transport funding, not admission to or the terms of admission at an educational establishment controlled by the authority: [48]-[49].