Zigmund v The Government of Slovakia

Under section 82 of the Extradition Act 2003, delay attributable to the person resisting extradition will generally not support an argument that extradition is oppressive. The court must assess whether the relevant circumstances justify refusal, but a person cannot ordinarily rely on delay caused by his own failure to comply with obligations imposed by the requesting state.

Where alleged offences occurred partly outside the requesting state, jurisdiction under section 137(4) is fact-sensitive. A request need not always explain every jurisdictional detail where the person was previously tried, was represented, and raised no jurisdictional objection. In such circumstances, the prior proceedings and supporting material may sufficiently demonstrate that the statutory requirements are met.

The claimant, a Slovak national, challenged his committal for extradition by a district judge and the Secretary of State’s subsequent order under the Extradition Act 2003. The requested extradition related to charges arising from conduct in Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

Three issues were raised: whether extradition was barred by double jeopardy under section 79(1)(b); whether return would be unjust or oppressive because of the passage of time under section 82; and whether Slovakia had established jurisdiction over conduct occurring in the Czech Republic for the purposes of section 137. The double-jeopardy issue was abandoned.

1. Disposition. The appeal against the district judge’s committal and the Secretary of State’s extradition order was dismissed.
2. Oppression and delay. The claimant had been detained and prosecuted over a lengthy period, but the court found that the relevant delay after the cancellation of his acquittal was caused by his departure from Slovakia and failure to comply with requirements concerning his residence and notification of changes of address. Applying the principle summarised in Regina v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Osman (No 4) [1992] 1 All ER 579, a person who has brought delay upon himself cannot generally complain of it under section 82. The unusual fact that he had remained in custody while his acquittal was under prosecutorial appeal did not justify a different approach.
3. Jurisdiction. The first and third charges concerned conduct occurring wholly in the Czech Republic. The issue under section 137(4) was fact-sensitive. The claimant had been legally represented at his Slovak trial and appeal, yet no jurisdictional objection had been taken. The letter from the Slovak Ministry of Justice confirming the transfer of the case from the Czech Republic, together with the close connection between the charges and the previous common state of Czechoslovakia, provided sufficient support for Slovakia’s jurisdiction.
4. The court distinguished the question of jurisdiction from the requirement, discussed in R (Castillo) v Kingdom of Spain [2005] 1 WLR 1043, that a requesting state describe the conduct alleged to constitute the extradition offences. Where jurisdiction is genuinely in issue, the requesting state should explain its basis in appropriate detail. That requirement was satisfied in the circumstances of this case.

The judgment describes challenges to decisions made at two earlier stages:

• Bow Street Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Pratt committed the claimant in custody on 24 August 2004 to await the Secretary of State’s decision.
• Secretary of State for the Home Department: An order for extradition was made on 24 March 2005.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against both decisions was dismissed.