Filipczak v Provincial Court (5th Criminal District) Warsaw-Praga, Poland

Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, oppression must result from the passage of time. The court must identify hardship caused by changes in the requested person’s circumstances during the relevant period and establish a causal link between that hardship and the delay. Delay caused by absconding or evading arrest will ordinarily be incapable of founding an oppression argument, save in exceptional circumstances. Family hardship alone is insufficient where alternative care is available and the relevant circumstances have not worsened because of the delay.

The appellant appealed against a district judge’s order for his extradition to Poland under section 21(3) of the Extradition Act 2003. He relied solely on section 14, contending that extradition would be oppressive because his wife and children would remain in the United Kingdom and one child required intensive diabetes management.

The district judge found that the appellant had deliberately remained out of Poland to evade prosecution and rejected the section 14 argument. The central issue was whether the family hardship was causally attributable to the passage of time and whether exceptional circumstances justified relief despite the appellant’s responsibility for the delay.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant’s extradition was not barred by section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003.
2. Section 14 requires a causal link between the passage of time and the alleged oppression. Oppression concerns hardship resulting from changes in the requested person’s circumstances during the relevant period. The court relied on Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779, whose principles were endorsed by Regina v Governor of Pentonville, Ex parte Narang [1978] AC 247, Regina v Governor of Brixton Prison and another, Ex parte Osman (No 4) [1992] 1 All ER 579, Cookeson v Government of Australia [2001] EWHC Admin 149 and Zigmund v Government of Slovakia [2005] EWHC Admin 2507.
3. Where delay is caused by the requested person fleeing, concealing his whereabouts or evading arrest, the resulting difficulties ordinarily cannot be relied upon as oppression. Only exceptional circumstances can justify relief in such a case.
4. Cookeson was materially different. There, the dependent child’s severe disability had progressively deteriorated, the need for care had increased because of the delay, and the applicant was the only person apart from statutory authorities able to provide the necessary care.
5. Here, the family hardship did not materially differ from ordinary hardship caused by a parent’s extradition. Alternative assistance could be provided for the child, and the family’s establishment in the United Kingdom and access to medical treatment had not been shown to result from the delay in a manner making extradition oppressive. The appellant had also brought the delay upon himself by absconding.

Mr Justice Roderick Evans agreed with the Lord Chief Justice’s reasoning and also dismissed the appeal.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal against the district judge’s order dated 7 September 2006 requiring extradition under section 21(3) of the Extradition Act 2003.